Employers' liability and workers' compensation: England and Wales by Lewis, Richard Kurt
Employers’ Liability andWorkers’
Compensation: England andWales
Richard Lewis
I. Introduction
A. The basic system of compensation and liability
1An employee injured at work in the UK is able to claim not only no-fault
social security benefit from the state under the industrial injuries com-
pensation scheme, but also damages from the employer if liability in tort
can be established. Use of one system of compensation does not lead to
exclusion from the other; there is no ‘employer privilege’ preventing an
employee claiming from both workers’ compensation and tort.
2This chapter describes and compares both of these systems of compensa-
tion. In this regard it is very unusual and breaks new academic ground.
Although in the UK there is a very extensive literature about the law of
tort, there is very little written about workers’ compensation under the
state scheme. In large part this is because lawyers are ever-present in tort
claims whereas they are very rarely involved in applications for social
security benefits. By comparing the two regimes, this chapter sets out a
context for work injury compensation which has not been made in recent
years. In particular, the comparative statistical analysis offers a new treat-
ment. In many respects, albeit in this summarised form, this chapter
provides a unique source.
3Entitlement to compensation under each regime is founded upon very
different bases. In general, whereas the state scheme requires only proof of
a work-related injury irrespective of how it occurs, the tort claim is usually
founded upon proof of another’s wrongdoing. However, this requirement
to prove fault is commonly undermined in tort when employers are held
strictly liable for breaches of duty placed directly upon them.
4When comparing the benefits offered, the differences are more apparent.
The state scheme provides benefit more quickly than the tort system pays
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damages, but it does not provide full compensation. A major difference is
that the state scheme does not compensate for financial losses such as loss
of earnings or the costs of care. Nevertheless claimants turn to this benefit,
together with others in the social security system, as their first sources of
support. In this sense, any later action begun in tort may be seen as merely
supplementary to the benefit claim. However, it is only the tort system
that aims to return the claimant as far as is possible to the position he was
in before the injury, and only tort is able to compensate for financial loss.
In awarding this full compensation, tort pays damages in the form of a
lump sum which, in catastrophic injury cases, can amount to millions of
pounds. It is then that the benefit claim may be seen as only peripheral to
the tort award.
5 However, if we look at total expenditure and the number of recipients of
compensation a different picture emerges. The annual expenditure upon
each scheme is now approximately the same.1 On the one hand, there are
twice as many new claims made in tort than under the industrial scheme;2
on the other hand, there are four times as many no-fault pensions in
payment as there are annual awards of lump sums in tort. The schemes are
therefore of similar historical importance, and although the significance
of tort has increased, neither scheme should be seen as necessarily inferior
to the other.
1. Tort
6 Although the origins of tort liability lie in pre-medieval times, the first
reported case of an employee suing his employer for personal injury was not
until 1837.3 The claim failed, and few such actions were brought in that
century and much of the next. There were many reasons why workers did
not sue. It is true that the legal rules were very much against them: proving
that another was at fault for their injury was fraught with uncertainty and,
if wrongdoing was established, workers faced several draconian defences
which enabled employers to avoid liability. Judges ‘quashed nearly every
innovative attempt to create law favourable to workers’.4
1 No 132.
2 No 129.
3 Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 Meeson &Welsby’s Exchequer Reports (M &W) 1; AWB Simpson,
Leading Cases in the Common Law (1995) 128. Employees did sue for unpaid wages and
other injustices.MA Stein, Priestley v Fowler and the Emerging Tort of Negligence (2003)
44 Boston College Law Review (BC L Rev) 689 at 725.
4 MA Stein, Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries [2008] University of Illinois Law
Review 933 at 983.
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7Amore important obstacle than these legal rules which limited claims was
the ‘living law’.5 That is, the real difficulties for employees lay not somuch
in tort textbooks but in the realities of workplace power and relations, and
in people’s attitudes towards misfortune. For example, many workers
never thought of suing because they were not even aware that a wrong
had been done to them. An accident was an everyday occurrence and part
of their way of life, and the risk of injury was seen as in the hands of Fate
rather than the employer. If workers were aware that a wrong had been
done, they were often ignorant of the possibility of bringing a claim.
Those who knew of the tort system found it very difficult to get legal
advice. If they did sue, they faced the prospect of incurring legal costs. A
more significant deterrent was the likelihood that a tort claim would lead
to the loss of work-related benefits such as employer’s sick pay, or
continued employment in an easier job, or medical treatment from work
doctors. Suing an employer ‘often meant antagonising the most powerful
men in the region and jeopardizing not only one’s employment prospects,
but also one’s housing, church membership and even access to town poor
relief’.6 Nor could workers easily endure the lengthy, complicated and
uncertain litigation process itself. Their claims then were opposed by the
best lawyers and by morally questionable defence strategies.
8The final difficulty faced by workers was that they often needed what tort
could not supply: urgent recompense to replace their wage loss. As a
result, they were all too ready to accept any money that was on offer. In
cases where the employer offered to pay some sickness benefit or provide
medical care a receipt invariably had to be signed and this released the
employer from any liability in tort. Workers were thus contractually
barred from pursuing a claim. A similar result was achieved by legislation
if a worker accepted worker’s compensation. By ‘electing’ to accept the no-
fault benefit the worker was required by statute to give up his right to sue
for damages in tort. In reality the worker had little choice: no-fault
compensation offered the certainty of an immediate fixed payment,
whereas damages were but a remote prospect for an uncertain sum via an
unpredictable route. Overall the tort system in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries has therefore been described as one of ‘non-
compensation’.7
5 L Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the late Nineteenth Century [1987]
American Bar Foundation Research Journal (Am B Found Res J) 351, reflected in a British
context in PWJ Bartrip/SB Burman, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry (1983).
6 JF Witt, The Accidental Republic (2004) 55.
7 Friedman [1987] Am B Found Res J 351.
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9 Gradually all this changed. Not only was there a shift in workplace power
relations and the ‘living law’ such as to make tort claims more likely, but
also the tort rules themselves were eased. For example, the defences were
imposed less readily and their effects made less severe; and in 1948 the bar
was removed so as to allow claimants to sue in tort as well as claim the no-
fault industrial injuries social security benefit. By then, not only did
workers have a different perspective upon accidents compared to their
nineteenth century counterparts, but they had also gained the assistance
of trade union funded lawyers. As a result, from the second half of the
twentieth century litigation substantially increased. By 1978 work acci-
dent claims had risen to constitute almost half of all personal injury
actions brought. However, with the continued rise of road accident claims,
work injuries have since declined in importance and now number less
than one in ten of all tort claims. Nevertheless they still account for about
78,000 claims a year.
2. Workers’ compensation
10 In the nineteenth century the failure of the common law to compensate
injured workers on any scale was a major reason for the creation of a no-
fault system outside of tort. The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897
imposed a duty on employers to make limited payments to the victims of
industrial accidents irrespective of whether those injuries were caused by
wrongdoing.8 Employers were left to arrange their own insurance to pay
the cost of these claims. This scheme has been called the ‘pioneer of social
security’ because it was the forerunner of broader welfare measures.9 Its
basic structure lasted over fifty years until the state took full responsibility
for all payments in 1948 and private insurers were then excluded from
involvement with the scheme.10 Because of the new no-fault system which
was being put in place, it was questioned whether access to tort for work
claims should continue, but eventually the worker’s ability to sue at
common law was retained.11
8 The nineteenth century history is traced in Bartrip/Burman (fn 5) and in Stein BC L Rev
689 at 725.
9 Social Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge (1942, cmd 6404).
10 National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946.
11 For the debate about whether tort as an ‘alternative remedy’ should be retained see PWJ
Bartrip, Workmen’s Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain (1987) ch 10 and
Report of the Departmental Committee on Alternative Remedies (1946, Cmd 6860),
chaired by Sir William Monckton.
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11Since 1948, in spite of a series of reforms designed to reduce expenditure,
cut overlapping benefits and improve efficiency, the no-fault scheme has
proved surprisingly resilient. In 1978 it was still paying out three times as
much as the tort system in total, and there were seven times as many
beneficiaries.12 It was not until 1995 that tort paid out more money per
year than did the industrial scheme, and the scheme continues to com-
pensate four times as many workers as tort each year. However, most of
these beneficiaries first started receiving their pensions some years ago,
and now tort compensates twice as many new claimants per year than the
industrial scheme. In historical terms, therefore, the schemes can be seen
as of comparable importance but it is tort that is the more significant
nowadays.
3. Why preferential compensation for workers?
12There is a fundamental question which has influenced the history and
present position of work claims: can the preferential treatment given to
workers compared to other injury victims be justified? The industrial
injuries scheme privileges workers by making available benefit which
cannot be claimed by those not injured in the course of employment. In
tort, although the compensation is assessed the same whether or not a
work injury is involved, liability is easier to establish in work cases because
strict duties are commonly imposed upon the employer. The advantage
given to workers in both of these areas has been challenged.
13In the landmark report in 1942 on the future of the welfare state it was
said that ‘a complete solution is to be found only in a completely unified
scheme for disability without demarcation by the cause of disability’.13
However, three arguments on balance eventually led to the retention of
the special scheme of compensation for work accidents. These were that –
■ many industries vital to the community were dangerous and it was
desirable that those working in them should have special protection;
■ those disabled at work were working under orders; and
■ only if special provision were made could an employer’s liability at
common law be restricted to the results of his negligence.
12 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury (1978, Cmnd 7054), chairman Lord Pearson vol 1 para 772.
13 Social Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge (1942, Cmd 6404)
para 80: ‘If a workman loses his leg in an accident his needs are the same whether the
accident occurred in a factory or in the street.’
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14 Each of these arguments looks outdated today. The first can be countered
by noting that the preference applies to all industries not just the danger-
ous ones. In addition, the award of a limited pension after injury is now
seen as little, if any, incentive to undertake risky work. There is a sharp
contrast here with ‘danger money’ paid before any injury occurs. Against
the second argument it can be argued that there is a great deal of
individual autonomy at work, and accidents that occur because of a
specific order are not common. The third argument has been entirely
overtaken by events. Retaining the industrial scheme in no way has led to
a reduction of liability at common law or to liability being confined to
where there is fault. Instead tort claims have increased considerably, many
of them based on strict liability.
15 In practice the preference was retained because of powerful political
arguments and a desire to avoid antagonising the labour movement and
the trade unions. The International Labour Organisation has concluded
that the distinction between work and other accidents is increasingly
anomalous and traditional practice is the main obstacle to change.14 One
text describes the preference as ‘simply indefensible’.15 However, to re-
place the labyrinthine maze of benefits presently facing the disabled with
a more comprehensive allowance is a difficult and expensive task.
Although sympathetic to such an aim, an official report in 1990 concluded
that there was still a case for retaining the industrial preference partly
because of the fear that any comprehensive allowance would be too little
to meet needs.16 The result is that, although the scope of the industrial
scheme has been reduced in the last 25 years, it continues to operate
alongside the tort system. Politically it remains a very difficult preference
to remove.17 In this respect it has much in commonwith tort liability itself
which continues to flourish in spite of criticism and the absence, in other
countries, of such liability for work injury. There is no prospect in the UK
of the tort liability rules being attenuated in any way, although proposed
procedural changes may have profound effects.
14 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 3 para 1009.
15 P Cane Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (7th edn 2006) 355.
16 Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, The Industrial Injuries Scheme and the Reform of
Disability Income (1990, Position Paper No 5).
17 S Jones, Social Security and Industrial Injury, in: N Harris, Social Security Law in Context
(2000) 494.
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B. Interaction with other institutions
16Both the tort and industrial injuries systems interact not only with each
other but also with other sources of compensation which derive either
from the welfare state18 or from employers and other private organisa-
tions.19 The relationships are diverse and complex, and are considered
under the particular headings below as they arise.
C. Empirical evidence
17There is a marked difference between the sources of information about
tort, on the one hand, and the industrial scheme, on the other. The
voluminous materials describing the general principles of the law of tort
can be contrasted with the paucity of information about the state benefit.
Lawyers earn much money from claims for personal injury, and tort is a
foundation subject studied in every law school. As a result there is a vast
academic and practitioner literature in law journals, and new tort text-
books are produced every year. By contrast, lawyers have very little
involvement with the industrial scheme, and it is very rarely examined
by law students. The last book describing its operation was that published
by the present author twenty five years ago.20 There is almost no periodical
literature. As a result, information about the scheme and analysis of it
derives predominately from official sources.
18The descriptions given here of the actual operation of these very different
systems of compensation relies upon empirical evidence gathered from a
variety of sources, a few key ones being footnoted below. Some of these
sources are official government reports about either the tort21 or the
industrial injuries scheme,22 whereas others are the result of private
18 R Lewis, The Impact of Social Security Law on the Recovery in Tort of Damages for
Personal Injury, in: U Magnus (ed), The Impact of Social Security on Tort Law (2003).
19 R Lewis, The Relationship between Tort Law and Insurance in England and Wales, in:
G Wagner (ed), Tort Law and Liability Insurance (2005).
20 R Lewis, Compensation for Industrial Injury (1986).
21 The Pearson Report (fn 12).
22 Department for Work and Pensions, Industrial Injuries Benefit Quarterly Statistics, table 1.2
at <http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/iidb/index.php?page=iidb_quarterly_dec09>
Department for Work and Pensions, Benefit Expenditure Tables – Medium Term Forecast,
at <http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/index.php?page=medium_term>.
England and Wales
143
research.23 A few key secondary sources on tort24 and the industrial
scheme25 are also footnoted.
II. Workers’ Compensation
A. Scope of cover
1. Workers covered
19 The industrial injuries compensation scheme only compensates those who
are ‘employed earners’. This does not include those who are self-em-
ployed. This means that whereas the 25 million people in the UK who
are employed by others under a contract of service are covered, about 4
million people who work for themselves are not.26 Although the self-
employed may be considered just as deserving of compensation, concern
has been raised that if they were brought within the industrial scheme it
would create uncertainty because of the greater difficulty in identifying
whether they are in the course of their employment when they are injured.
A narrower recommendation that at least those self-employed working in
construction and agriculture be brought within the scheme has not been
implemented.27 This is in spite of the fact that many of those engaged in
these occupations are not really self-employed in any meaningful way.
20 The distinction between an employee and independent contractor is
explored further below in relation to employers’ liability claims.28 If we
compare tort liability we find that the primary common law and statutory
duties are similarly only owed to employees and not to the self-employed,
23 Empirical studies are extensively referenced in D Dewees/D Duff/M Trebilcock, Exploring
the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (1996). For statistical analyses
see, UK Personal Injury Litigation 2009, Datamonitor Report, December 2009 and
International Underwriting Association of London, Fourth UK Bodily Injury Awards Study
(2007).
24 Atiyah’s Accidents (fn 15); WVH Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn 2010);
S Deakin/A Johnston/B Markesinis, Tort Law (6th edn 2008);M Lunney/K Oliphant, Tort Law
(4th edn 2010).
25 Lewis (fn 20); NJ Wikeley/AI Ogus/E Barendt, The Law of Social Security (5th edn 2002);
Bartrip (fn 11); JC Brown, Industrial Injuries (1982), the Department for Work and Pensions,
Decision Makers’ Guide offers detailed analysis of the scheme in a series of publications at
<http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/specialist-guides/decision-makers-guide/
#vol11>.
26 Office for National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/
pdfdir/lmsuk0910.pdf>.
27 Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, Report (1993, Cm 2177).
28 No 104 below.
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although at times the statutory duties can also extend to visitors and
others. However, where the tort action is based on vicarious liability
anyone who is injured can sue. In that respect tort has wider coverage
because claimants can include not only those in business for themselves
but also, for example, visitors to the workplace or members of the public
injured on the roads or elsewhere by the negligent employee when doing
his job.
21Employed earners under the industrial scheme are covered from their first
day at work, and they do not have to qualify, as they do for certain
contributory benefits, by paying a minimum number of payments into
the national insurance scheme. Those serving in the armed forces are not
covered by the scheme, but are entitled to their own special benefits.
22There are territorial limits to the industrial scheme as with any regime of
social security. However, many of those injured abroad are now covered.
These include those for whom national insurance contributions are paid;
those in European Union countries, or countries with which Britain has a
reciprocal agreement; and airmen, mariners and others.
2. Spatial, temporal and other limitations
23As we shall see below there are two basic routes to gaining entitlement to
benefit. A claimant must show that the injury is either a prescribed disease
or a ‘personal injury caused… by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment ….29 These last words, first used in the Workmen’s
Compensation Act 1897, have been adopted by English speaking jurisdic-
tions throughout the world. It has been suggested that the phrase has
given rise to more litigation than any other in the English language.30 Its
uncertain scope is not the result of poor legislative drafting, but is
inherent in the phrase; it is caused by the very attempt to distinguish
work injuries from others.
a) The accident must ‘cause’ the injury
24The claimant must show that the industrial accident is not only a neces-
sary condition which caused the injury (causa sine qua non) but also that it is
a cause of some potency which contributes materially to the injury (causa
29 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s 94 (1).
30 Departmental Committee Report on Workmen’s Compensation (Holman Gregory Re-
port) (1920, Cmd 816) para 29.
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causans). However, the industrial accident need not be the sole or even the
predominant cause of injury. For example, if a heart attack is suffered at
work the crucial question is ‘was it the disease that did it, or did the work
he was doing help in any material degree?’31
25 To further illustrate the issues that can arise we can examine how the
scheme deals with susceptibility to injury before the industrial accident
occurs. The pre-existing non-industrial condition or weakness could be
treated in three distinct ways:
■ It could be held to be the only material cause of injury. This occurred
where a degenerative disc condition gave rise to a spinal collapse which
just happened to take place at work.32 No entitlement to benefit then
arose.
■ It could be held not to be a material cause of injury at all. This
happened in a case where the disc collapsed as a result of lifting some-
thing at work.33 Here there was full entitlement to benefit because the
industrial cause was held to be the sole legal cause of injury.
■ Finally, it could be held to be a contributory cause of the injury among
other, industrial causes. Here, there could be a reduction in the assess-
ment of disablement to take account of the non-industrial condition.
26 If the injury is caused by coming into contact with the work premises, it
has been held that the employment will be considered to be the cause even
if the claimant fell as a result of high blood pressure, his artificial leg, his
carelessness, or something else unexplained.34
b) The accident must arise ‘out of ’ employment
27 In order to exclude from the scheme injuries which result from ordinary
risks faced by the public at large, this phrase requires accidents to be
caused in some way by work. However, it has only rarely led to the refusal
of benefit. Statute prescribes that certain causes of accidents are deemed to
arise ‘out of’ employment provided that the accidents were also in the
course of employment and the claimant did not contribute to them.35 This
applies to accidents caused by:
31 R(I) 13/81.
32 R(I) 6/82.
33 R(I) 19/63.
34 R(I) 11/80.
35 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s 101.
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■ Another’s misconduct – such as an assault by strangers irrespective of
whether the claimant was singled out because of his job
■ Another’s skylarking or negligence – so that a claim may succeed if
injury is caused by a fellow employee who is either a practical joker or
simply careless
■ Animals – as where a door to door agent fell over a dog at the property
he was visiting36
■ Being struck by lightning or any object
c) The accident must arise ‘in the course of employment ’
28Usually the relationship between the accident and the work is obvious.
However, difficulties can arise in a significant number of cases because of
the varied nature of employment; there may be uncertainty as to what
exactly the claimant was employed to do, or the discretion that he may
have had to do it. The boundaries of when work begins and ends, or is
interrupted, can be difficult to draw. The scheme attempts to do so by
requiring that accidents arise ‘in the course of employment’.37
29This phrase is notorious. One judge suggested that it has ‘been worth – to
lawyers – a King’s ransom’.38 It has accounted for over half the litigation
upon the scheme. Although it may appear that the extensive body of case-
law interpreting the phrase only adds to the confusion, in fact many of the
cases can be confined to their own facts and are of limited value as
precedents. By contrast there are a few key decisions which repay study
because they offer general guidance concerning the factors which should be
considered when determining the scope of the scheme. Even these cases,
however, emphasise that no single factor is to be taken as conclusive.39
30Broadly, the course of employment gives rise to questions based upon the
time, place, and the activity being pursued by the claimant when he was
injured. Three basic questions then arise:
i) Did the accident occur during work hours?
31The limits of work cannot be defined by the written terms of contract
alone: some allowance can be made for the claimant to be at work both
36 R(I) 13/60.
37 Lewis (fn 20) 50–89,Wikeley/Ogus/Barendt (fn 25) 726–743.
38 Lord Denning in R v National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Michael [1977] 2 All England
Law Reports (All ER) 420.
39 Nancollas v Insurance Officer [1985] 1 All ER 833.
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before and after the set hours in the contract. For example, a worker who
arrived half an hour early to change into her work clothes and go to the
canteen was held to be within employment at that time.40 By contrast,
someone who arrived ninety minutes early to avoid the rush hour was
outside the scheme.41 Refreshment breaks on the employer’s premises
are almost always protected. Workers injured when ‘on call’ cause
particular difficulties: are they standing by to be called back to duty
and thus outside of the scheme, or are they performing their duty of
standing by?42
ii) Did the accident occur at the place of work?
32 The precise place of work sometimes can be difficult to locate although it
generally includes, for example, access to the area where the claimant has
been or is about to work. A ‘public zone’ test helps to determine the limit:
the claimant usually must be in the area from which the public are
excluded. This was the case where a seaman, in boarding his ship, was
injured on a private jetty which he had permission to use but not the
public at large.43 Whether the employer owns the land upon which the
accident happens is an important although not conclusive factor. The
further away the claimant is in time and space from the hours and place
of employment, the more likely it is that the risk is shared by the general
public and is outside the industrial scheme. Although more difficulties
arise where the claimant is peripatetic, claims can still succeed as where a
social worker was injured descending a common staircase in a block of
flats having concluded her visit to one of the properties.44
iii) Did the accident occur whilst the claimant was doing
something which was part of his employment or reasonably
incidental to it?
33 If so, the employment could be extended beyond the usual hours or
place of work; if not, it could interrupt the employment and place the
claimant outside the scheme. Relevant questions include whether the
employee had implied permission and whether the employer knewwhat
40 R v National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte East [1976] Industrial Cases Reports 206.
41 R(I) 3/62.
42 R v National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Reed (1980) appendix to R(I)7/80.
43 Northumbrian Shipping Co v McCullum (1932) 101 Law Journal Reports, King’s Bench New
Series (LJKB) 664.
44 R(I) 3/72.
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was being done. The contract of employment itself is rarely helpful in
determining the limit. The criteria for deciding the question have
changed since workmen’s compensation first began: an accident can
now be accepted as arising out of and in the course of the employment
if the person is doing something which is reasonably incidental to their
employment even though they may have been doing it for purposes of
their own.
34What may be considered incidental to employment is better understood
when related to particular cases illustrating the relevant factors. The
following examples have been chosen either because they involve the
most common problems, or because they involve extensions of the course
of employment which have been laid down by statute.
d) Interruptions or breaks in work
35If the claimant is injured whilst acting reasonably during a break in work
at his employer’s premises the accident is likely to be within employment.
Permitted activities have included not only going to the toilet or the
canteen, but also going to a union meeting,45 a day release class46 or even
to play sport in certain circumstances.47 Relevant factors are:48
■ The nature of the employment
■ The duration of the break
■ The place of the accident
■ Whether the employer consented to the activity
■ Whether the activity is in the employer’s interest.
36By contrast, if the claimant acts unreasonably he could fall outside
employment. This happened where a factory worker was hit by a truck
whilst in a queue to use a booth in order to smoke a cigarette.49 He was
still in the queue even though his scheduled break had ended five
minutes earlier. By deliberately going against instructions and not
returning at the end of the break he was held to be avoiding work and
to be outside employment. The decision appears harsh, but statements
45 R(I) 63/51.
46 R(I) 2/68.
47 R(I) 13/66 contrast R v National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Michael [1977] 2 All ER
420.
48 R(I) 4/67 (T).
49 Re Culverwell [1966] 2 Queen’s Bench (QB) 21.
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made in the case also support a less strict approach: the judge considered
that generally a claimant would be within employment if injured at his
place of work and during work hours by a risk incidental to employment
even though he may not be doing his actual work but, for example,
chatting to a friend or smoking. Even a negligent or deliberately disobe-
dient act would not necessarily remove the claimant from the course of
employment unless he was doing something different from what he was
employed to do.
e) Travelling and commuting cases50
37 There are almost as many deaths caused by the daily journey to and from
work as there are at work itself.51 As an exception to the rules in almost all
European countries, the UK does not include travelling to and fromwork as
within employment.52 ‘Normally a person’s employment begins when he
arrives at his place of work and ends when the person leaves it…’.53 The
general approach is subject to a number of wide-ranging exceptions.
Clearly, for example, those with occupations requiring them to travel,
such as bus or delivery drivers will be in the course of employment. Other
exceptions involve those:
■ Travelling in transport arranged by the employer. This is a statutory
exception.54 The use of ordinary public transport will not suffice
■ Travelling on a specific journey as instructed by the employer
■ Travelling on the employer’s property or in areas where the public are
denied access
■ Travelling in the course of a peripatetic occupation. Those who are door
to door agents or home helps are therefore usually covered except when
travelling to their first call of the day, or when on the way home, or if
they deviate from their route for their own purposes
■ Employees who are still on duty because their responsibilities continue
whilst travelling. Relevant although not conclusive factors in determin-
50 R Lewis, Accidents Whilst Travelling and the Limits of Compensation for Industrial
Injury (1986) 8 Journal of Social Welfare Law 193.
51 L Pickup/SW Town, A European Study of Commuting and its Consequences (1983) 106.
52 For European comparisons see theMutual Information System on Social Protection in the EU
(MISSOC) <http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/missoc_tables_en.
htm>.
53 R(I) 12/75(T).
54 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s 99 (1).
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ing whether the claimant is only travelling ‘to’ duty as opposed to ‘on’
duty include:
– Was the claimant being paid for time spent travelling?
– Were travel expenses to be reimbursed?
– Was the claimant carrying equipment or tools related to the job?
– Was the claimant on call or required to report at intervals to his
employer?
– Was the claimant travelling by a direct route?
38Proposals to change the general rule that travelling is outside employment
were rejected by Government almost 30 years ago,55 and have not been
reconsidered since. Themain objection was that the risks being faced were
no different to those encountered by the public in general so that, if travel
were included, the concept of industrial preference would be placed under
great strain. In addition, the limits of the scheme would be more un-
certain and the difficulties in investigating claims would increase because
the employer could not provide the direct evidence needed.
f) Acting in an emergency
39Employees may have to respond to unexpected events at work. If they act
reasonably in doing so they will not take themselves outside the course of
employment even if they attempt to do something which they may not
have been employed to do. These rules apply in situations far beyond
those where the emergency services may become involved. For example,
lorry drivers have been held to be within employment under the emer-
gency principle even though all they were doing was moving other goods
in order to deliver their own56 or assisting another road user who had
broken down and was obstructing traffic.57
40Statute also provides help for those injured in the more dramatic acts of
emergency.58 If the claimant is injured at or near his place of work whilst
taking emergency action to avoid people being injured or property being
seriously damaged, he will be deemed to be within employment. This
enabled a milkman to obtain benefit when he was injured attempting to
55 Reform of the Industrial Injuries Scheme (1981, Cmnd 8402) para 66.
56 R(I) 11/56.
57 R(I) 11/51.
58 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s 100.
England and Wales
151
rescue children from a burning house. Under the statute there is no need
for the act done to be only for the employer’s benefit.
3. Effect of the victim’s contributory negligence
41 The industrial scheme is based on no-fault. This means, firstly, that
neither the employer nor any of his employees has to be shown to be at
fault for the claim to succeed; and secondly, the negligence of the claimant
himself will not bar entitlement to benefit. In theory, therefore, the
contributory negligence defence which applies to many tort claims has
no part to play in the industrial scheme.
42 However, the position is not always quite so clear cut: if the claimant’s
conduct creates a new or different risk from that which arises from the
employment, and this risk is the real cause of the accident, then the injury
will not arise out of and in the course of employment and the claim will
fail entirely. This argument can have an even greater effect than contrib-
utory negligence does in tort for it may lead to the loss of all compensa-
tion. There is no way in which blame could lead to a reduction of the
benefit to take account of the claimant’s wrongdoing; the concept of
apportionment for contributory negligence cannot apply with the result
that the claim either succeeds or fails entirely.
43 The rules can be illustrated by the denial of benefit to employees who left
their place of work for their own purposes, as where an employee went
off to explore another part of the building.59 However, in more recent
times a less strict view has been taken of the scope of employment than
was the case in the past. In particular, it is now required that the
claimant’s conduct must create a new or different risk. This can prevent
the denial of benefit as in the leading case where the claimant was
injured by an explosion when he lit a cigarette near a place where,
unknown to him, gas was escaping.60 The danger of such an explosion
was present before the claimant used his lighter because there were other
naked flames heating variousmachines near the escaping gas. It was held
that the risk of explosion was clearly one of employment, and that,
although the claimant had acted for his own purposes, he had not
created a new or different risk from that which already existed. Benefit
was therefore payable.
59 R(I) 45/59.
60 R(I) 2/63(T).
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Acting contrary to orders or rules
44A distinction is drawn between orders which define what work is to be
done, and those which merely describe how it is to be carried out. The
former is more likely to limit the course of employment so that contra-
vening clear orders concerning what work is to be done could prevent
entitlement arising. However, there is a legislative provision which
further protects claimants here because it deems accidents to be within
employment if they would have been so had it not been for the claimant
breaking regulations or orders.61 Thus a miner succeeded when he was
injured after illegally hitching a lift underground. However, the claimant
must still show that he was continuing to act for, or in connection with,
his employer’s business. The difficult question to be asked is ‘ignoring the
prohibition, was the claimant doing his job?’ Because of this the claim
failed when a dock worker was injured moving an obstacle with a fork lift
truck which had been left unattended by its driver.62 This decision has
been considered harsh and has been distinguished from other cases on the
basis that the prohibition against the unauthorised driving had been
strictly enforced, and only this justified the refusal of benefit.63
B. Compensation trigger
45There are two routes only to obtaining benefit. The claimant must show
that his injury is either the result of an ‘accident’ or a ‘prescribed disease’.
Traditionally accidents have been much more likely to be the basis for a
claim. However, the nature of work has changed: when the industrial
scheme was introduced in 1948 almost two thirds of jobs were in heavy
industry whereas today 70 % of employees work in office and service
industries. As a result, accidents are less common. However, with increas-
ing scientific recognition of the effects of work upon health, diseases have
become much more important so that there are now as many claims for
diseases as there are for accidents.64 This is in stark contrast to the tort
system where there are five times as many claims founded upon accident
61 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s 98.
62 R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex parte Bresnahan [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports
(Ll Rep) 69.
63 R(I) 1/70.
64 Department for Work and Pensions, Industrial Injuries Benefit Quarterly Statistics, table 1.5.
These cover the period to December 2009. Allowance is made for the exceptional
increase in disease claims following the prescription of new conditions. <http://
research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/iidb/index.php?page=iidb_quarterly_dec09>.
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as opposed to disease.65 The traditional preference for traumatically
caused disability by accident reflects the mistaken assumption that acci-
dents are man-made whereas diseases are natural hazards.66 Ironically
there is empirical evidence that it is the victims of disease rather than
accident who are more likely to have serious medical needs and be left
with a residual incapacity.67
46 At first sight there seem to be separate legal provisions dealing with each
of the two forms of injury. However, as explained below, the dividing line
is often unclear, and the scope of an ‘accident’ is not as limited as it may
appear. Because of this, there are diseases which can be considered to
result from an accident. In addition, for historical reasons, the meaning of
accident has been strained so that, unexpectedly, it includes not only
diseases but also other conditions which give rise to entitlement to
compensation.
47 The ‘prescribed diseases’ can only be compensated if they appear on a
legislative list. By contrast, accidents are open-ended and not confined by
the words of a statute. An advantage of claiming for a prescribed disease is
that there are statutory presumptions which can help satisfy the require-
ment to prove a work connection. There are no such presumptions to
assist claimants in the case of accidents.
1. Accidents
48 Although an accident has been defined as ‘any untoward event which is
not expected or designed’,68 it is clear that an event need not be unforesee-
able or exceptional in order for benefit to be paid. The claimant does not
have to show that the strain which caused his back injury was unusual for
the job or that it was an entirely unexpected risk.69 It is the result that
must be unintentional not the act itself. Thus the farm labourer who
deliberately handled frozen material throughout the day and then found
that he had suffered frostbite was able to claim.70 Acts intended by other
people to inflict injury are also covered by the scheme even though they
are deliberate. For example, a schoolteacher who was beaten up by his
65 See no 115 below.
66 J Stapleton, Disease and the Compensation Debate (1986).
67 D Harris et al, Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury (1984).
68 Fenton v Thorley [1903] Appeal Cases (AC) 443.
69 CI 5/49.
70 CI 126/49.
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pupils was found to have suffered injury by accident.71 Unlike the word-
ing in many private insurance policies, the scheme does not require that
an accident result from an event external to the claimant’s body. It can
therefore include an internal physiological change for the worse, such as a
muscle strain or rupture.
49Accidents must be distinguished from, firstly, diseases compensated un-
der the prescribed list system described below and, secondly, conditions
which, although developing as a result of a work process, cannot be
attributed to an accident. This last distinction refers to a situation where,
because of his work, the claimant’s condition becomes worse over a period
of time and it may not be possible to identify any precise moment when
physical deterioration occurs. An accident cannot then be found. Instead
the wear and tear is the result of ‘process’ and, as such, is outside the
scheme unless it constitutes a condition covered by the list of prescribed
diseases. For example, injury to a hand caused by a pneumatic drill could
be held to be neither an accident nor a prescribed disease.72 Although this
distinction between accident and process is crucial, it can be a difficult one
to draw and it depends on the facts of each case. Three factors are relevant:
■ Continuity – Does the injury result from continuous day to day expo-
sure? If so, it is more likely to be process and outside the scheme, as
where there was continuous exposure to dust over twenty years.73
■ Length of time – The longer the exposure needed to produce injury, the
more likely it is to be held the result of process and outside the scheme.
The claimant was therefore denied compensation where his injury was
the result of exposure to various chemicals over a period of eighteen
years.74 By contrast, an injury resulting from only three days spent
stitching leather was held to be the result of accident.75
■ Particular event causing injury – If the claimant can point to a particular
event at a precise point in time which caused injury, it is more likely to
be considered an accident. The claimant could not do this and benefit
was not payable where he suffered from a nervous disorder caused by
general uncongenial working conditions.76 This contrasts with another
case where the claim succeeded because each repeated explosion at the
71 Trim School v Kelly [1914] AC 667.
72 However, in 1996 carpal tunnel syndrome was listed as a prescribed disease for those
using hand held power tools.
73 Roberts v Dorothea Slate Quarries Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 201.
74 R(I) 7/66.
75 R(I) 43/61.
76 Fraser v Secretary of State for Social Services [1986] Scots Law Times (SLT) 386.
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workplace was held to be an accident, and it was a series of these
accidents which gave rise to the claimant’s neurosis.77
50 There are two arguments, in particular, which may be made by claimants
in order to establish injury by accident. They illustrate the strain that has
been put on the word, and the difficult and often artificial distinctions
which have to be made:
■ The first argument is that injury can result from a series of accidents
rather than a process. This enabled the claim to succeed where a hernia
was caused by the continual operation of a stiff lever, each movement
leading to a minute widening of a tear in the muscle wall and each
amounting to an accident.78
■ The second argument is that injury has resulted from one accident
which occurred during a process whichmay have worn down the body’s
defences. This accident can simply be the final event – such as the
breakthrough by which infection penetrates the skin. Even the onset
of disease can then be an accident, as where a stray germ of anthrax
entered the body via the eye.79 Infective skin conditions are often
regarded as having developed by accident. Similarly, if a harmful
process culminates at a point where a physiological change for the
worse occurs, a claim may succeed. This happened where pressure on a
nerve from a buckle on a knee over a period of ten weeks culminated in
paralysis of the leg.80 This argument blurs the distinctions between
accidents, diseases, and processes, with the result that the law can be
extremely difficult to apply.
2. Disease81
51 As described immediately above, it may sometimes be possible for injury
by disease to be classified as an accident. However, this route cannot be
taken if the disease is on the prescribed list specified by statute as directly
falling within the scheme.82 Then the conditions set down by the list must
be satisfied. The list contains not only diseases readily recognisable as such
77 R(I) 43/55.
78 R(I) 77/51.
79 Brintons v Turvey [1905] AC 230.
80 R(I) 18/54.
81 N Wikeley, Compensation for Industrial Disease (1993); R Lewis, Compensation for
Occupational Disease (1983) 5 Journal of Social Welfare Law 10.
82 The list is contained in the Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed Diseases)
Regulations 1985 SI No 967.
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(for example, pneumoconiosis and certain forms of cancer) but also con-
ditions which may result from certain types of work processes (for exam-
ple, occupational deafness and cramp of the hand). The list is definitive of
the diseases or conditions that may be compensated in the sense that if
they are not on the list and are not the result of accident, no claim can be
made for them even if they can be shown to have a work connection.
52The statutory list, begun in 1906, now runs to 72 diseases or conditions. It
is divided into four sections according to whether the cause is a physical,
biological, chemical or other agent. If the disease is on the list, there is
usually a statutory presumption to help establish the work connection.
However, the presumption does not apply if the disease is listed for an
occupation where proof in the individual case is specifically required.
53The list imposes five different types of conditions which limit the scope of
potential claims by –
■ The type of work done
■ The minimum period of exposure to the risk
■ The period of onset within which the disease must develop following
exposure
■ The minimum level of severity of the disease
■ Whether or not the presumption applies that the disease has been
caused by the occupation.
54The list prescribes diseases only in relation to particular occupations where
workers are thought to be especially at risk: in theory, the risk of contract-
ing such a disease should not be common to all people. In addition, the
legislation requires that the attribution to particular employments should
be established or presumed with reasonable certainty. However, these
stringent requirements have been relaxed a little in recent years. For
example, ‘reasonable certainty’ is now interpreted to mean that a disease
may be prescribed as long as there is proof only on a balance of probability
that there is a work connection.83 In addition, some afflictions common in
the population at large have now been listed, such as deafness which was
prescribed in 1975 although only in relation to very particular occupations.
Similarly, bronchitis was added to the list in 1993, but was confined only to
those who were coalminers. In spite of such evidence of a more liberal
approach, in general it remains the case that there is reluctance to prescribe
83 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s108 as interpreted by the Industrial
Injuries Advisory Council (IIAC) in its Periodic Report (1993).
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illnesses which are common in the population at large, especially arthritic
conditions, upper limb disorders, stress84 and mental illnesses. As a result,
overall, the recipients of benefit for prescribed diseases represent only the
tip of the iceberg of occupational ill-health generally.
55 Occasionally the conditions laid down by the job descriptions are easily
satisfied. For example, tuberculosis is prescribed very broadly for ‘any
occupation involving contact with a source of tuberculosis infection.’ How-
ever, at other times the conditions are much more detailed and stringent, as
where vibration white finger is prescribed for a list of very specific occupa-
tions. For example it is prescribed where there is ‘holding of material being
worked upon by pounding machines in shoe manufacture.’ Time limits
may also be imposed: for occupational deafness the claimant must have
worked in the prescribed occupation for at least ten years, and must make
the claim within five years of leaving it; for chronic bronchitis and emphy-
sema the period for work is twenty years in a coal mine.
56 The list system has been gradually extended since it was first devised over
a hundred years ago. However, the process of adding new diseases and
occupations has been very slow. For example, it took thirty years from first
investigation of vibration white finger before entitlement to compensa-
tion arose. Nor is prescription retrospective in its effect. The Recommen-
dation of the European Commission that Member States adopt the Euro-
pean schedule of occupational diseases85 has not been supported.86
57 A fundamental objection to the system is that, if the disease is not on the
list and an accident cannot be established, then no benefit can be claimed
nomatter how clear the work connection. Thirty years ago it was proposed
that for diseases not on the list the claimant should be allowed to produce
evidence to show that work was the cause of the disablement in his
individual case.87 However, this proposal has never been enacted. More
recently it has been noted that there is little evidence of the scale of the
problem, and that it can be alleviated by including individual proof as a
possibility when new diseases are listed.88 For example, when occupa-
tional asthma was listed as being caused by various agents, a further
84 Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, Stress at Work as a Prescribed Disease and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (2004) Position Paper No 13.
85 90/326/EEC, Official Journal (OJ) L 160, 26.6.1990, 39–48.
86 Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, European Commission Recommendation – Occupa-
tional Diseases (1992) Position Paper No 8.
87 Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, Industrial Diseases: A Review of the Schedule and the
Question of Individual Proof (1981, Cmnd 8393).
88 Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, Coverage under the Industrial Injuries Scheme for
Injury by ‘Process’ (1995) Position No 9.
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general category was added which allowed recovery for ‘any other sensitis-
ing agent inhaled at work.’
58Whereas about 200,000 people presently receive disablement benefit
because they have suffered an accident, about 58,000 do so because they
have a prescribed disease. This reflects the historical importance of acci-
dents, but does not indicate how disease has increased in significance in
recent years. There are now as many new claims made based upon disease
as there are for accidents with over a thousand made each month. Deaf-
ness, vibration white finger and pneumoconiosis account for half of the
prescribed disease pensions which are presently in payment and generally
reflect exposure to risk factors some years ago. Of new awards, diseases
associated with asbestos now account for about 15 % of the total, about the
same as for each of the other three main diseases.
59There are four questions to be determined in a prescribed disease claim:
■ The diagnosis question – is the claimant suffering from a prescribed
disease?
■ The disablement question – has the disease resulted in the claimant
suffering a loss of faculty?
■ The employment question – has the claimant been employed in an occupa-
tion listed in relation to the disease? Although it is not necessary for the
claimant to have worked exclusively in one of the processes listed, the
involvement should be more than merely trivial so that, in one case,
two days in seven years work was insufficient.89
■ The causation question – is the disease due to the claimant’s occupation?
Here in many cases the claimant can be helped by a statutory presump-
tion: if he has worked in a relevant occupation in the month preceding
the development of the disease, it is presumed that the disease is due to
the nature of the employment unless the contrary is proven.
C. Scope of protection
1. Personal injury
60The legislation specifies that ‘personal injury’ must be suffered. Although
this can include a relatively trivial harm, in most cases the scheme requires
disablement to be assessed as at least 14 % in order for benefit to be paid.
89 R(I) 8/57.
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In effect, this means that the claimant must suffer the equivalent of the
loss of an index finger in order to recover any benefit.
61 Injury is usually all too apparent. However, where the effect is less clear,
the claimant must show that he has suffered some physiological or
psychological change for the worse. He cannot simply rely upon an
increase in pain to found entitlement. For example, although an internal
injury such as a muscle pull or a rupture may be sufficient, if the claimant
is already suffering from disc trouble and experiences an increase in back
pain whilst lifting at work, hemust show that there is a physical deteriora-
tion in the disc condition itself.90 The increase in pain alone will not
suffice.
Mental injury
62 Personal injury includes injury to the mind as well as the body. However,
stress related illnesses are not included on the list of prescribed diseases
under the industrial scheme, and very few of them result in any form of
compensation. In spite of the very widespread nature of mental illness and
stress and the recognition that much of it is associated with work, there is
little acknowledgement of this in the industrial scheme. It is clearly
possible for a claim to succeed if a mental condition follows on from an
accident at work which causes physical injury.91 In theory, even if the
claimant does not suffer physically he may claim for a mental condition
alone if it is the result of an accident caused by his job. On this basis, for
example, benefit was paid where the claimant developed a neurosis after
witnessing the death of another employee at work.92 However, in such a
case the claimant must establish not only that there has been a specific
disturbing event, but also that it constitutes an accident and is the cause of
his condition. Because of this, it was doubted whether a fire officer could
recover when he suffered a post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of
attending a series of horrific fatal crashes unless he could identify the
precise incidents which had specifically caused his mental state.93 It is not
therefore surprising that most employees suffering the usual stress related
illnesses find it almost impossible to claim.
90 R(I) 1/76.
91 CI 4/49.
92 R(I) 49/52.
93 Chief Adjudication Officer v Faulds [2000] 2 All ER 961.
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2. Other than personal injury
63The industrial scheme offers no compensation for damage to workers’
property or for pure economic loss. Nor does it cover dignitary injuries
resulting from discrimination or sexual harassment. Scope for such claims
lies outside of the industrial injuries scheme and is to be found especially
in general employment and anti-discrimination legislation.94
D. Heads and levels of benefit
64The industrial scheme offers monetary compensation only. Medical care
and rehabilitation assistance are available free of charge under the Na-
tional Health Service, but no special provision is made for those injured at
work. Nor is the scheme linked to any retraining or support services to
encourage a return to work. About £893 million is spent on industrial
injuries benefit being about 0.5 % of total benefit expenditure.95 This
represents a fall of about 12 % from the level of twenty years ago when
about £984 million was spent.
65There are about 40,000 new claims made each year fairly evenly split
between prescribed diseases and accidents.96 Less than half of all these
claims result in the payment of benefit, often because the minimum
threshold of disablement is not reached.97 In 2009 there were 324,000
beneficiaries of payments under the industrial scheme, the great majority
of them having first gained entitlement many years earlier, with many of
them retaining entitlement to benefits which are no longer available to
new claimants. As a result of the build up of pensions in the system, about
two thirds of recipients are aged over 60. There are four times as many
men than women. Of new claimants, women account for only 30 % of
accident cases, and less than 10 % of disease cases. On average, claimants
are assessed as suffering only minor disablement and receive about £48 a
94 Below nos 122–123.
95 Department for Work and Pensions, Benefit Expenditure Tables – Medium Term Forecast
Table 1b for 2009–10. <http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/index.php?page=medium_
term>. The total benefit expenditure was £ 155 billion.
96 Department for Work and Pensions, Industrial Injuries Benefit Quarterly Statistics, table 1.5
up to December 2009 making allowance for a sharp increase for diseases when a new
disease is prescribed. <http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/iidb/index.php?page=iidb_
quarterly_dec09>.
97 No 60.
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week,98 this being about a tenth of the average weekly wage.99 The
maximum award without any supplement in 2011 is £150–30p, and is
less than a third of the median wage.
66 The benefit is paid exclusively by means of a pension; lump sums of up to
about £4,000 which used to be awarded for minor injuries were abolished
in 1986. Pensions increase in line with inflation and are often paid for life
even though that period is uncertain. As a result their capital value can be
high,100 although the pension cannot be commuted into a lump sum. A
pension can be increased later if there is an unforeseen aggravation of
injury. In these respects the pension is more flexible and offers a more
certain future for claimants than the once and for all lump sum tradition-
ally awarded in tort. However, in serious injury cases the recent develop-
ment of periodical payment orders for damages in tort offers greater
flexibility.101
67 Although twenty five years ago there were several different benefits
available under the industrial scheme, today only disablement benefit
remains. In effect, this is a payment only for non-pecuniary loss. It
compensates for the effect of the work injury upon body or mind irrespec-
tive of whether it results in a reduction in earnings or in additional costs.
The focus is upon injury only to person and not to pocket. There is one
very limited exception to this: in cases of the most severe injury, affecting
only one in a hundred recipients of disablement benefit, two supplements
can be claimed to meet the need for care and attendance.
68 It is very important to emphasise that loss of earnings resulting from the
industrial injury is not covered by the scheme. Reduced earnings allow-
ance which used to compensate for this was abolished in 1990 (although
120,000 old pensions remain in payment and new entitlement for old
exposure can still arise). The allowance used to account for 40 % of the
expenditure upon the industrial scheme. It was withdrawn because of its
extreme complexity and the high cost of determining the precise reduc-
tion in earnings. This was in spite of a maximum award being set which,
in practice, prevented 90 % of claimants from obtaining their full loss. By
contrast, in other European countries most of the benefits that are paid
under workers’ compensation schemes are for loss of earnings.
98 Department for Work and Pensions, Industrial Injuries Benefit Quarterly Statistics, table 1.2:
<http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/iidb/index.php?page=iidb_quarterly_dec10>.
99 Office for National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/
pdfdir/lmsuk0910.pdf>.
100 No 76.
101 Nos 126–127.
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69Industrial death benefit which offered a very small preferential payment
to surviving spouses is another benefit which has been abolished. Since
1988 there have been no benefits payable to dependants under the
scheme. The costs of private medical treatment or rehabilitation have
never been recoverable under the scheme. Overall, therefore, no compen-
sation is available for any pecuniary losses caused by the injury. Industrial
deaths continue to decline and remain among the lowest in Europe.102
Although the industrial scheme now offers only disablement benefit, it
must be remembered that the claimant remains entitled to other benefits
available under the social security scheme irrespective of where injury
occurred or how disability was caused. In particular, for short term
absence from work claimants can obtain statutory sick pay (currently
only £81 a week) and thereafter, in the longer term, employment and
support allowance (up to £100 a week). There are also disability living
allowances with additions to cover the need for mobility (up to £51 a
week) and the need for care (up to £73 a week). There are also means tested
tax credits for those partially incapacitated. Apart from general social
security provision, most claimants will also benefit from sickness or
disability monies available from their employer under their contract of
employment. The level of provision here varies according to the employ-
ment, with the working class receiving the lowest payments. In many
schemes the employee may receive the full wage loss but the duration of
the payment will depend upon the particular work done. The range of
welfare and other support available to injured people was considered in an
earlier book in this series.103 In spite of this additional provision, the UK
spends a lower proportion of its Gross Domestic Product on sickness,
invalidity and occupational benefits than other European countries.104
This is partly offset by claimants also being allowed to sue in tort for their
work injuries.
1. Assessment
70To gain entitlement to the industrial benefit it is not necessary to show
that the resulting disablement is permanent, but it must continue for at
least fifteen weeks because entitlement usually does not arise until that
102 Health and Safety Executive, Statistics on Fatal Injuries in the Workplace 2010–11
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/fatalinjuries.htm>.
103 Magnus (fn 18).
104 Eurostat, Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts 1990–1998 (2000, European
Commission).
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length of time has passed since the accident or onset of the disease.
Entitlement may then continue for as long as the disablement lasts.
Payments can therefore endure through incapacity, unemployment and
retirement, and end only on death. As a result, as discussed below, the
pension can be very valuable if assessed in capital terms.
71 The extent of disablement is assessed with the help of medical authorities.
It is expressed as a percentage with the maximum basic award being the
pension which statute prescribes as payable for 100 % disablement. Per-
centages are rounded up or down to the nearest multiple of ten. The
assessment is made by comparing the claimant to a person of the same age
and sex who is of normal health. This assessment is therefore an objective
one which ignores the claimant’s own personal or social circumstances,
and no attempt is made to compare the claimant’s condition before and
after the injury. Instead, the comparison is with a ‘normal’ person. In
theory, this is very different from the much more subjective assessment
which takes place in tort, although, in practice, the tort award is much
more divorced from the individual than textbooks would lead us to
suppose.
72 In arriving at their assessment the authorities are assisted by a crude
statutory table. This deals almost entirely with anatomical losses and not
the less visible injuries such as internal ones. In tort there are much more
sophisticated non-statutory guidelines to assist assessment.105 By contrast
the industrial injuries table indicates, for example, that loss of a thumb is
assessed as 30 % disablement; loss of an eye is assessed as 40 % disable-
ment; and amputation below the knee with a stump exceeding 9 centi-
metres but not exceeding 13 centimetres is assessed as 50 % disablement.
However, these figures are not set in stone: the percentages can be varied if
they do not provide reasonable assessments of the degree of disablement.
The great majority of claimants suffer onlyminor injury. About two thirds
are assessed at less than 24 % disabled, and this is then rounded so that by
far the most common pension is that payable for 20 % disablement.106
73 The table can be criticised on several grounds. It pays too little attention to
the functional effects of disablement: what does the disability prevent the
claimant from doing? It offers little help with non-anatomical injuries so
that low back pain, for example, is notoriously difficult to assess. The
105 Judicial Studies Board, Guidelines for the Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury
Cases (10th edn 2010).
106 The average payment, taking into account the minority of substantially higher awards,
is £ 48 a week and is equivalent to a pension slightly more than that payable for 30 %
disablement.
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table is also biased in favour of minor injury and under-compensates
severe disablement. A counterweight to this criticism is the important
provision in the legislation which excludes lesser injuries from the
scheme. Except in cases of certain industrial diseases such as pneumoco-
niosis, no entitlement to benefit arises unless the claimant is assessed as at
least 14 % disabled. This is the equivalent to the loss of an index finger.
Any other finger can be lost in an industrial accident and it will give rise to
no entitlement to benefit.
2. Rate of payment
74The rate of the pension is directly proportionate to the percentage of
disablement assessed. In 2011 the maximum payment for 100 % disable-
ment is £150 a week so that a 50 % assessment – equivalent to the loss of all
four fingers on one hand – results in a pension of £75. However, as with
many other compensation schemes, the payments disproportionately
relate to minor injuries with the average pension being only £48 a week.
75By contrast, in cases of the most severe injury two further supplements to
disablement benefit may be paid. These are constant attendance allowance
and exceptionally severe disablement allowance. However, only about 1 %
of pensioners receive these supplements because entitlement depends
upon establishing at least 95 % disablement. Although constant atten-
dance allowance can increase the disablement pension by up to £120 a
week, the real benefit to the industrially injured is in fact much lower.
This is because there is another attendance allowance benefit available
under the main social security scheme and this provides up to £73 a week
and it is not available to those who receive the industrial allowance. The
weekly preference given to those injured at work is thus about £47. About
a third of those who receive constant attendance allowance may also gain
entitlement to exceptionally severe disablement allowance if they can
show that the need for such attendance is likely to be permanent. A
further increase of £60 a week is then payable to very small numbers of
people. Again benefits under the main scheme may reduce the overall
value of the industrial preference. Recommendations that these two
supplements should be abolished so as to leave industrial injury victims
reliant upon the provision made in the main social security scheme have
not been enacted.
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3. Comparison of the industrial injuries pension with damages
in tort
76 The value of an industrial injuries pension can be high if assessed in
capital terms. This is particularly so because it can last for life and it is
protected against inflation. In addition, it is tax free and generally does
not lead to a reduction of other contributory benefits also being received
under the main social security scheme. As a result the capitalised value of
the pension can often compare very favourably with the lump sum
awarded in tort, at least if attention is confined to the lesser injury cases.
77 By contrast, the income arising from the lump sum awarded in tort is
taxed, and it has been found difficult to protect many claimants from the
ravages of inflation. The assessment in tort is based upon achieving a rate
of return from investment which, in practice, is impossible to obtain. The
lump sum paid is invariably the result of a compromised deal out of court.
Because of the uncertainties involved in litigation, this deal is likely to
involve an agreement to accept significantly less than the sum which the
strict rules applied by courts would allow. However, when it comes to
catastrophic injury the industrial scheme cannot begin to match the
multi-million pound awards or guaranteed pensions of tens of thousands
of pounds available in the tort system. This is because the scheme offers
nothing for care costs or for loss of earnings and pension entitlement,
whereas these constitute the major elements of the damages awarded in
tort where there is serious injury.
78 To illustrate the potential value of disablement benefit let us take the case
of a typical recipient who has an assessment of close to the average
awarded of 30 %. This could be awarded for the loss of an eye. The
resulting pension is then £45 a week amounting to £2,344 a year. If this
were being received at the young age of 21, the lifetime capitalised value
of the pension would be £74,724.107 Even if the claimant were aged 60, the
capital value of the pension would still be £42,946. By contrast the non-
pecuniary valuation in tort for the loss of an eye is between £36,000 and
£43,000.108 This comparison illustrates that, over the course of their life-
time, almost all workers suffering lesser injury obtain more for their non-
pecuniary loss from the industrial injuries system than from tort. Under
the industrial scheme the younger the worker the more valuable their
107 Government Actuary’s Department, Actuarial Tables for Use in Personal Injury and Fatal
Accident Cases (7th edn 2011) table 1 using a 2.5 % discount rate for a loss for life for a
man.
108 Judicial Studies Board (fn 105).
Richard Lewis
166
total pension, whereas in tort age rarely affects the amount paid unless the
claimant is very old. In making these comparisons it must be remembered
that the industrial scheme, unlike tort, offers nothing for earnings lost or
for care costs incurred.
79Let us take the comparison further by examining what would happen in
the case of the most catastrophic injury, such as quadriplegia or severe
brain damage. The maximum basic pension which could be awarded by
the industrial scheme is £150 a week, equivalent to £7,815 a year. (This
ignores the two supplements that are also payable partly because they
have lesser equivalents under the main social security scheme). For a 21
year old the capitalised value of the basic pension is £249,083. For a 60
year old it is £143,025. These figures, derived from actuarial tables, are
not far out of line with the prescribed amount of between £212,000 and
£265,000 awarded in tort for the most severe injury. However, again we
must remember that the tort system would also take into account the
financial losses and care costs incurred. This means that invariably in such
a case, especially if a high income earner is involved, the award in tort
would run into millions of pounds, and the difference with the industrial
scheme would then be very apparent.
E. Funding systems
80In 1948 the old system of privately financed workmen’s compensation
gave way to the state-run industrial injuries scheme. Private insurance was
replaced by public funding. A separate fund was created to pay for the new
scheme. This was financed by compulsory contributions per employee; the
parties could not choose to self-insure and opt out of the system. The
initial proportion levied was 40 % each from both the employer and
employee, with the remaining 20 % being contributed by the Exchequer
from the general taxes it received. The set contributions did not distin-
guish between industries on the basis of their relative risk of causing
injury: such rating was rejected as being unduly expensive to administer
and contributing little to industrial safety.109 As discussed above, employ-
ees were covered from their first day at work; there was no requirement
that they contribute a minimum number of contributions in order to be
109 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 1 para 902. Similar conclusions are reached in
K Armstrong/D Tess, Fault versus No Fault for Personal Injury – Reviewing the Interna-
tional Evidence (2008) paper presented at the Institute of Actuaries, Australia.
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eligible for the benefits. The scheme thus had only a loose connection with
the insurance principle.
81 The funding system remained in place for over 25 years, although the
contribution proportions changed so that eventually employers were
funding 57 %, employees 26 % and the Exchequer 17 %.110 Gradually the
administration of the scheme was integrated within the general structure
of social security. In 1973 this culminated in the abolition of the separate
fund for industrial injuries.111 In part this was because of the general
dislike of earmarked contributions and the difficulty and expense of
working them out. In 1990 funding for the scheme was transferred to the
Consolidated Fund so that the scheme is now wholly tax supported. This
means that there is now no separately earmarked fund nor are there
contributions which directly support industrial injuries compensation.
F. Administration and adjudication of claims
1. Claims and appeals
82 The industrial injuries scheme, being part of general social security provi-
sion, is administered by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).
Claims are made to the DWP and a lay decision maker determines the
claim without a hearing on the basis of all the evidence on paper, includ-
ing advice that may be sought from doctors who have been especially
trained in disability analysis. Adjudication in industrial injury claims is
usually more complicated than in other social security cases, often because
of the medical questions that may have to be resolved. Claimants are more
likely to challenge the decision with the result that there were 7,300
appeals in 2009–10 from the 40,000 claims for benefit.112
83 Disputes take place outside the court structure for civil justice in general.
Instead there is a right of appeal against the DWP decision to a First-tier
Tribunal. This tribunal consists of a legally qualified judge who may sit
alone or with up to two other people who have either financial, medical or
disability expertise. A further appeal then lies to the Upper Tribunal and
beyond, if permission is obtained, to the Court of Appeal.
110 Brown (fn 25) 84.
111 Social Security Act 1973 s 94.
112 Ministry of Justice, Tribunals Service Quarterly Statistics 2009–10, table 1.1c <http://www.
tribunals.gov.uk/Tribunals/Documents/Publications/tribs-q42009-10-statsc.pdf>.
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2. Tribunals not courts
84Tribunals are very different from those traditional courts which determined
workmen’s compensation cases before the system was nationalised in 1948.
‘In no time at all workmen’s compensation descended from its lofty ideals
of being a no-fault social service into a squalid legal battlefield between
trade unions and insurance companies, with lying, cheating, and chicanery
on all sides and astronomical expenditure on administrative, legal and
medical costs.’113 It may be argued that tort claims today share many of
these features. By contrast the tribunal system offers a cheap, speedy and
more informal system of justice, and the involvement of lawyers is much
less common.114 The tribunal judge takes a more active part in proceedings
than a judge in the traditional civil court. The procedure is much less formal
and witnesses are rarely called. The process of appeal typically takes from
three to eight months, and the hearing lasts usually less than an hour.
Claimants do not have to attend, although most do. This is partly because,
in work accident cases, the majority are assisted by a lawyer or representa-
tive appointed by their trade union, although there is no legal aid available
to pay for the cost. The tribunal service itself is free.
3. Administrative cost
85In 2007 the administrative cost of paying disablement benefit was said to
be only 2 % of the total cost of the scheme.115 In contrast, fourteen years
earlier the cost was said to be 11 % of the benefit expenditure.116 Whatever
the exact figure, it sharply contrasts with that for the tort system which
consumes in operating costs 45 % of the total of damages paid and admin-
istrative expenditure. That is, for each pound spent on the tort system
only 55 pence goes to the claimant.117 Whereas the administrative cost of
the tort system is almost as much as the damages it pays out, the industrial
injuries scheme is much more cost effective partly because it is based on
113 OH Parsons, A No-Fault System? Not Proven (1974) Industrial LJ 129.
114 J Baldwin/N Wikeley/R Young, Judging Social Security (1992).
115 Department for Work and Pensions, The Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit Scheme –
a Consultation Paper (2007) 4.19. The costs nevertheless are about 20 % of the cost of
new claims.
116 Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, Periodic Report (1993) 28.
117 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 1 para 256. The Lord Chancellor’s Civil Justice Review
(Cm 394, 1986) estimated that the cost of the tort system consumed 50 to 70 % of the
total compensation awarded in personal injury cases. See no 138 below.
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no-fault, involves few lawyers, and uses the tribunal system rather than
the traditional court structure.
G. Right of recourse of workers’ compensation institutions
1. Rights of recourse against the employer
86 The industrial injuries scheme is financed by the state. Workers’ compen-
sation institutions as exist in other European countries are unknown in
the UK and no rights of recourse therefore directly arise. Because these
workers’ compensation institutions elsewhere in Europe provide collat-
eral benefits to the injured, they are allowed subrogation rights to recover
their payments from tortfeasors. They enforce these rights via bulk
recovery arrangements whereby liability insurers agree in advance to
reimburse a percentage of all claims under a certain amount. This avoids
litigating individual cases and makes subrogation administratively work-
able and financially efficient.118
87 Bulk recovery agreements in favour of the state in respect of social security
benefits do not exist in the UK because there is a comprehensive benefit
recovery system in place as described below.119 The state is able to reclaim
the social security benefits paid to a claimant in respect of an injury for
which damages in tort are also paid. Unlike in other countries, each
individual claim for personal injury is examined to determine whether
benefit can be recovered from the compensator on the facts of the case. In
the great majority of cases the compensator is the liability insurer of the
employer although a few large employers and state organisations are
allowed to self-insure and pay damages directly themselves. However, if
no tort claim is brought, benefits cannot be recovered even though it may
appear that an employer was responsible for the injury. The state has no
independent right of recourse against a tortfeasor; its reimbursement is
parasitic upon the tort claim.
118 W Pfenningstorf/D Gifford, A Comparative Study of Liability Law and Compensation in
Ten Countries and the USA (1991) 134.
119 Nos 142–149 below.
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2. Rights of recourse against a co-worker or third party
88In theory, the state’s claim for reimbursement against the compensator
could include a claim against a co-worker who negligently caused the
injury and personally paid the damages. However, in practice this never
happens, and no recourse arises. Even though the basis of many tort
claims rests upon the principle of vicarious liability, in practice the
negligent co-worker causing the injury never actually pays the damages
himself. It is always the responsibility of the employer or his insurer.
There is even an agreement between insurers and the employers’ organi-
sation that insurers will not subrogate and seek to recover the damages
they have to pay from the negligent employee.120
89A similar position arises in relation to reimbursement from third parties.
In theory, for example, it is possible that a negligent manufacturer could
be liable for an injury at work resulting from the supply of defective
equipment. However, the law makes the employer strictly liable in such a
case with the result that, in practice, the employer would always be the
party to be sued, although he might seek to join the manufacturer to the
action. Again, therefore, the state is unable to seek reimbursement from
any third party unless it actually pays damages directly to the claimant.
H. Interaction with general social welfare provision and private
insurance
1. The sources of funding
90The funds of first (and often last) resort are those provided by the state.
That is, the claimant usually will first seek social security benefit and free
medical care from the National Health Service. It is also possible for a
minority of claimants to benefit from various forms of private insurance.
These include accident and disability insurance, permanent health insur-
ance, and private medical insurance. More important for the victim of an
industrial injury are the benefits usually provided by his employer. These
include statutory sick pay, a low amount specified by legislation and
currently £81 a week. In contrast occupational sick pay may cover the
greater part or even all of any wage loss for a set period in accordance with
the terms and conditions of employment. That is, the injured worker’s
right to continue to receive wages will depend upon the terms negotiated
120 No 140 below.
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as part of the contract of employment. Some jobs may offer protection for
manymonths absence fromwork andmay replace in full the earnings that
otherwise would be lost; other occupations will offer only limited repay-
ment by allowing only a percentage of income to be recovered for a shorter
period of time. In practice, the most generous protection is more com-
monly found as a part of the terms and conditions of work for those in
middle class jobs, and there is much less support given to those in work-
ing class or manual jobs.
2. Deductibility of benefits
a) Within social security
91 There are general provisions within social security law which are aimed at
preventing over-compensation for the same contingency or need. The rules
are complex and inconsistent.121 However, in general it can be said that the
receipt of industrial injuries disablement benefit has a limited effect on
other benefits received. Claimants can often retain their entitlement to
contributory benefits in addition to their industrial pension. For example,
it does not affect the receipt of incapacity benefit or a retirement pension.
Nor is the benefit taxable so that it does not affect receipt of working or
child tax credits. Overall this establishes the basis for the industrial pre-
ference which, as discussed above, can be very valuable in certain cases.
92 However, disablement benefit will result in the reduction or loss of certain
means tested income-related benefits. These include income support, pen-
sion credit, housing benefit, and council tax benefit. Even though disable-
ment benefit is not paid because of loss of income, it is taken into account in
this way and may result in an injured worker being worse off than if a claim
had not been made. Disablement benefit can also affect how much war
pension is paid. Finally, receipt of industrial injury constant attendance
allowance prevents there being entitlement to attendance allowance or
disability living allowance under the main national insurance scheme.
b) Other than social security
93 There is no question of disablement benefit being taken into account to
reduce the compensation which the claimant or his employer may have
arranged via a private insurance scheme. Nor will any occupational pay-
121 Wikeley (fn 81) 259 ff.
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ments for sickness or disability be affected. Private arrangements or
benevolence are to be left out of account. Nor can any employer or private
insurer claim from the industrial injuries fund any reimbursement of the
benefits it provides. However, the disablement benefit paid can be recov-
ered by the state from the compensator if there is a successful claim for
damages in tort as explained next.
I. Interaction with employers’ liability
94The claimant in the UK is allowed not only to claim industrial injury benefit
under the social security scheme, but also to sue the employer in tort. There
is no employer privilege which exempts the employer from liability. The
two types of claim are entirely separate so that there is no question of the
social security claim being brought in the same proceedings as the tort
claim. The compensation is sought from different funds, the one public and
the other private, and they involve very different procedures, personnel and
adjudication. A notable difference is that only about 1 % of all tort claims are
determined by a judge, the rest being settled out of court for a compromised
sum. By contrast all benefit claims are determined and never compromised.
95Before 1948 claimants were faced with a difficult choice: they could either
obtain industrial benefit or damages in tort. They could not do both. For a
variety of reasons claimants overwhelmingly opted for, or were pressed
into receiving, the no-fault social security benefit.122 This left the tort
system to play only a very limited role in the industrial field.123 There was
judicial criticism of the ‘deplorable’ and ‘extremely shabby’ tactics used by
insurers to prevent tort claims from being pursued.124 Eventually the
employer privilege was abolished by statute,125 and in the last sixty years
or so tort claims for work accidents have flourished.
96Until 1990 the state had no right to recover any of the social security benefits
it paid to a claimant who later succeeded in a tort action. Legislation then set
up the Compensation Recovery Unit able to claw back most of the benefits
paid by the state to accident victims up to the date of the settlement of their
damages claims. This scheme is described in more detail below.126
122 WA Dinsdale, History of Accident Insurance in Great Britain (1954) 161.
123 Bartrip (fn 11) ch 10.
124 Deane v H F Edwards & Co (1941) 34 Butterworth’s Workmen’s Compensation Cases
(BWCC) 183.
125 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948.
126 Nos 141–149 below.
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III. Employers’ Liability
A. Classification
97 The liability of employers to employees for personal injury has traditionally
been seen as lying within the law of tort. Although an action in contract is
theoretically possible, it is rarely pleaded because in virtually all cases there
would be no difference in result. The rules that are applied are part of the
general civil law of obligations, although special provision has also been
made at times for work accidents alone. One example of this is where
statute provides that employers must insure against their liability.
98 Liability founded upon breach of statutory duty is the most important
example of where, in effect, special provision has been made. Although
the broad principles of such liability derive from the general law of tort, in
practice the litigation is dominated by employers’ liability claims: judges
have held that violation of health and safety legislation will usually be
enough, of itself, to found breach of duty in tort. By contrast, they have
refused to allow road traffic legislation to be used to define the tort
standard in the same way. As a result, the rules developed for breach of
statutory duty have created a particular liability regime for work acci-
dents. Notably this involves the imposition of what is often a stricter form
of liability than that based upon proof of fault. In addition, for example,
the defence of voluntary assumption of risk has been held inapplicable in a
breach of statutory duty claim. The result, in practice, is that the basis of
liability for work accidents is often very different from liability for other
causes of injury.
B. Elements of liability
99 In broad terms, there are three bases for imposing liability upon an
employer. In order of development, these are where the employer is liable –
■ for the breach of duty by another employee who was acting in the
course of employment (vicarious liability)
■ for breach of a primary duty owed directly by the employer to the
injured employee, the duty being placed on the employer by judges
(breach of common law duty)
■ for breach of a primary duty placed on the employer by Parliament
(breach of statutory duty).
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100The result is that liability is sometimes based upon fault (especially where
vicarious liability or breach of common law duty are involved), and some-
times it is strict (where statutory duty is involved). These different poten-
tial liabilities can be confusing. There is some uncertainty, for example,
about the scope of strict liability. As a result, practitioners regard this area
of law as more complicated than that involving road accident claims.127
1. Vicarious liability
101Although originating in medieval times, vicarious liability was not relied
upon by an employee to sue his employer until the nineteenth century.
The first reported case was in 1837 when an action against a butcher for
the negligence of another employee in overloading his cart resulted in
injury to the claimant.128 Liability was rejected because the claimant and
the negligent employee were both employed by the butcher, and it was
not thought appropriate for the law to intervene in the work relationship.
This ‘common employment’ defence was very harsh and considerably
restricted the use of vicarious liability.129
102Later in the century both Parliament and the judiciary recognised the
severity of the law and tried to limit the effect of the defence of common
employment. The Employers Liability Act 1880 prevented the defence
from arising in a few situations. In addition, judges found that an
employer could be liable for breach of his own duty of care owed directly
to the claimant and involving no other employee. Vicarious liability and
the defence to it was not then in issue. Finally, judges directly limited the
scope of common employment by finding, for example, that it did not
apply if a worker was injured when facing the same risks as those run by
the general public. This was the case where a bus driver was injured when
in collision with another bus. Partly because of these limitations the
defence gradually fell into disuse and more claims based on vicarious
liability then succeeded. However, common employment was not formally
abolished until 1948.130 Even after that date, in practice, for a while only a
few workers brought claims in tort.131
127 H Genn, Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlements in Personal Injury Actions (1987).
128 Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 M & W 1.
129 RA Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ Compensation
Law (1982) 16 Georgia Law Review 775.
130 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 s 1 (1).
131 Bartrip (fn 11) ch 10.
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103 Vicarious liability requires that the fellow employee be held liable for
causing the injury and this almost always involves proving that he was at
fault. This is in sharp contrast with an action for breach of statutory duty
where liability is often imposed irrespective of wrongdoing. Once fault is
proven, vicarious liability requires that the injury be committed, firstly, by
an employee as opposed to an independent contractor, and secondly, in
the course of employment. Both of these requirements have already been
discussed in relation to the industrial injuries benefit scheme,132 and the
lengthy examination of the course of employment is equally applicable
here. There are only minor differences. For example, the special statutory
provisions in relation to the course of employment under the industrial
scheme are not replicated in tort law, although this has little effect in
practice.
a) Who is an employee?
104 The old test of whether the employer was in control of the worker retains
some importance, but today judges look at a much wider range of factors
to determine the relationship. These include, for example, the method of
payment, what financial risks are taken, who owns the tools or work
equipment, what degree of responsibility was taken, and what rights there
are to dismiss or to delegate the work. The description of the relationship
in the contract is of relevance but cannot provide the definitive answer
partly because the parties have incentives to disguise the true position.
Overall, judges in recent years have made employers liable for a wider
range of workers to reflect the increasing complexity of employment
practices and structures.133
105 Although generally employers are not vicariously liable for the acts of
independent contractors, they may be liable if they have breached a
primary common law or statutory duty placed upon them. For example,
although they are not vicariously liable for the fault of an electrical
contractor causing an appliance to become dangerous, they will be strictly
liable for breach of the statutory duties to ensure that tools and equipment
are safe for workers to use. Employers may also be liable for breach of
other ‘non-delegable’ duties although the scope of these is uncertain.134
132 Nos 19 and 28–40 above.
133 R Kidner, Vicarious Liability: ForWhom Should the Employer be Liable? (1995) 15 Legal
Studies 47.
134 Rogers (fn 24) 20–21.
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b) What is the course of employment?
106The cases here are as numerous as they are in relation to the industrial
injuries benefit scheme and for the same reasons: the difficulty at the
margin of defining the limits of work. Again the decisions often must be
read as confined to their specific facts. An act will be found to be within
employment if it is expressly or impliedly authorised by the employer, or if
it is sufficiently connected with the employment such that it can be said to
be reasonably incidental to it. Many of the cases deal with issues already
discussed such as those relating to travelling in the course of employment,
or acting in an emergency, or establishing where the time and spatial limits
of work are to be found. As under the industrial scheme, a more expansive
view has been taken of the course of employment in recent years. In
particular, it has been held that liability can arise if the act in question is so
closely connected with the employment that it would be just to hold the
employer liable.135 This vague test further expands potential liability.
2. Breach of common law duty
107Partly as a means of evading the defence of common employment which
previously limited the scope for vicarious liability, judges imposed duties
directly upon employers. There are four such duties. The employer must
provide:
■ competent staff
■ adequate plant and equipment
■ a safe place of work, and
■ a safe system of working
108These duties, originating in the nineteenth century, are now of limited
importance in practice because of the development of the statutory duties,
discussed below. There are several reasons for this. Although they cannot
be delegated to another, the common law duties require the employer, or
his agent, to be shown to be at fault. In contrast, many statutory duties
give rise to strict liability. In addition, the defence of voluntary assump-
tion of risk cannot apply in a statutory duty case. The statutory duties are
more precise, usually being set out in the legislation in considerable detail
when compared to the vague generalities of the common law. They offer
much clearer guidance concerning the factors affecting, for example,
135 Lister v Hesley Hall [2002] 1 AC 215.
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whether there is a safe place of work, or when liability might arise for
manual handling, or using work equipment. As a result, in practice only
the common law requirement to provide a safe system of work has much
effect, and even then, in many cases, it is often included by lawyers in the
pleadings only as a makeweight argument. However, the duty to provide
competent staff may still have some value in extending liability beyond
that imposed vicariously because it makes the employer liable even for
staff acting outside the course of their employment, as where injury is
sustained as a result of horseplay or deliberate assault by a fellow worker.
3. Breach of statutory duty
109 Health and safety legislation, beginning at the very end of the nineteenth
century, was primarily designed to regulate workplace risks by setting up
an administrative system to inspect premises and direct measures to
prevent injury. It was backed by various enforcement powers, and if
necessary, the criminal law. However, the tort system soon adopted and,
in many ways, warped this legislation so that nowadays its primary legal
function is to enable injured workers to obtain compensation in tort. It
does so by creating a presumption that violation of the criminal law in
relation to health and safety amounts to a breach of the standard of care
required in tort. In fact, the legislation has been more commonly em-
ployed in the civil law to create an action for breach of statutory duty than
it has been used in the criminal law to punish offenders.
110 As the result of the implementation of various directives of the European
Community the UK now has a very comprehensive and detailed set of
regulations covering all aspects of work safety. In particular, a group of
regulations enacted in 1992 had wide effect, partly because the rules they
created are not specific to particular industries or trades as were the
regulations they replaced. Instead the rules now apply to offices, shops,
factories and other workplaces alike. Although they are now a very
important source of civil liability and extensively used by practitioners,
the regulations are not discussed in detail in tort textbooks and academic
law journals pay them very little attention.
111 Whether a regulation imposes strict liability upon an employer depends
upon how it is worded. Some duties are absolute and allow for no excuse,
as where escalators are required to function safely.136 Other duties are
136 The Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations (1992) (SI No 3004) reg 19.
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subject to qualification, as where compliance is needed only ‘so far as is
reasonably practicable’, a phrase which has given rise to a large body of
conflicting decisions. Sometimes strict liability has been imposed and the
claim has succeeded even though the dangers could not have been fore-
seen or even though the cost of taking precautions would have been
prohibitive. At other times in interpreting ‘reasonably practicable’ liabil-
ity has been denied because fault has been absent. Courts have failed to
evolve any consistent approach to the problem of whether or not to
impose strict liability. A major reason for this, according to one commen-
tator, is that some judges have been influenced by the fact that there is
already compensation without fault available under the industrial injuries
scheme.137 However, in general we can say that the increasing scope of
regulation in recent years has led to a stricter liability in tort for work
injuries. In particular, the requirement that all employers must now
formally ‘undertake a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks’
which affect each employee has proved a valuable aid in establishing
liability.138
112Although liability may be strict, this does not mean that causation cannot
be used to defeat a claim. For example, it can be argued that the employ-
er’s failure to assess the risk is not a cause of the injury suffered if the
accident would have occurred anyway. A notable case in which causation
was raised to defeat the claim involved an employer who was found not
liable even though he was in breach of regulations by supplying safety
boots with a small hole.139 The boots were intended to protect a milk
tanker driver against the risk of falling objects. In fact, during freezing
weather the driver had to dig out his vehicle from ice and snow. Water
penetrated the boot and he suffered frostbite. It was held that this was not
the risk against which the boots were intended to guard, and the kind of
injury was not therefore protected. The causation argument, in effect,
defeated strict liability.
4. Effect of the victim’s contributory conduct
113Unlike under the industrial scheme, the victim’s conduct can form the
basis for the partial defence of contributory negligence. This results in a
reduction of the damages to be paid. Until legislation was passed in 1945
137 Atiyah’s Accidents (fn 15) 98.
138 The Management of Health and Safety at Work at Regulations 1999 (SI No 3242) reg 3.
139 Fytche v Wincanton Logistics Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 221.
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any fault on the part of the claimant would have led to the action being
barred, but now the damages can be apportioned according to the parties’
share of responsibility for the injury caused so that the claimant will
usually obtain most of his damages.140 Contributory negligence reduces
damages in about a quarter of all tort claims whereas no such reduction
can take place under the industrial scheme because it is not based on fault
whether it be of the employer, another employee, or the claimant him-
self.141
114 In tort there remain several possibilities for avoiding liability entirely.
First, as we have seen immediately above, causation arguments can be
used to show that the employer’s breach of duty was not legally the cause
of injury. Secondly, if the claimant’s conduct is such as to take him outside
the course of his employment his claim is likely to fail because he will not
be able to rely upon those duties of care which would be owed to him
whilst doing his job.142 Finally, in very rare cases the defence of voluntary
assumption of risk might apply to defeat the entire claim, although it has
been held that this cannot be argued where a breach of statutory duty
forms the basis for the action. Until the 1940s voluntary assumption of
risk, contributory negligence and common employment comprised the
‘unholy trinity’ of defences which helped to ensure that very few claims by
workers ever reached the tort system.
C. Scope of protection
1. Accidents and disease
115 Unlike under the state scheme, tort claimants seeking compensation for
disease are not confined by a set list prescribing the illnesses or conditions
covered and limiting compensation to particular employments. Instead
they can sue upon proof that the disease was caused in the individual
circumstances of their work. However, tort is similar to the industrial
scheme in that both systems favour those injured by accident rather than
disease. Those involved in accidents are more ready to attribute responsi-
bility and sue for their injuries partly because the cause of their misfor-
tune is clear. By contrast, victims of disease may not realise that they have
been injured by another’s wrongdoing, and may find great difficulty in
140 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
141 Harris et al (fn 67) 91.
142 Discussed in relation to the industrial scheme at nos 41–44.
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attributing cause perhaps some years after their initial exposure to sub-
stances at work.143 As a result far fewer claims are made in tort for disease
than for accident: in the three years from 2007 to 2010 there were 2.4
million claims made for all types of personal injury but only 49,000 of
these related to disease, being about one in fifty of the total.144 Within that
three year period there were 253,000 work injury claims, but diseases
constituted only about one fifth. In fact, therefore, in spite of an open-
ended system in tort, there are disproportionately fewer claims made for
disease than under the closed list industrial scheme where new claims for
disease now equal those for accident.145
116In spite of these figures we can say that tort has increasingly recognised the
hidden effects of work upon health and this has been reflected in litigation
statistics. For example, greater knowledge of the risks of repetitive manual
movements, or of asbestos, or noise at work has at different times resulted
in many new cases being brought. In particular, the claims of miners in
respect of, firstly, respiratory disease, and secondly, the use of vibrating
tools led to settlement schemes which were called ‘the biggest personal
injury schemes in British legal history and possibly the world’.146 From
1999–2004 about 760,000 of these particular claims were registered. Under
the respiratory disease scheme £2,300 million was paid out, and under the
vibration scheme a further £1,700 million.147 Whereas the median award
for vibration was £8,300, for respiratory disease it was only £1,500. The cost
of administration was very high: lawyers’ costs under the respiratory
scheme averaged £1,920 out of a total cost of £3,200 required to administer
each claim.148 These settlements have all now been concluded and this
accounts for the substantial fall in the number of disease claims in the
more recent figures of actions brought in tort for personal injury.
2. Personal injury
117It is usually all too apparent whether or not the claimant has suffered an
actionable personal injury. However, a rare case in which the issue was
143 Stapleton (fn 66).
144 Compensation Recovery Unit reply to a Freedom of Information Act request, 14 April
2010.
145 No 58 above.
146 Department of Trade and Industry, Coal Health Claims <http://www.dti.gov.uk/
coalhealth/01.htm>.
147 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 25 June 2009, Written Answer at column
c1110W.
148 National Audit Office, Coal Health Compensation Schemes, HC 608 session 2006–07.
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raised was where workers had been exposed to asbestos and had devel-
oped pleural plaques which were asymptomatic.149 They were denied
compensation because the damage they had suffered had not made them
physically worse off; the change in condition, of itself, was insufficient to
ground the action.
118 Liability for personal injury includes any form of mental injury or distress
if accompanied by physical injury. Even mere upset or minor disturbance
causing a sleepless night can then be compensated. However, where there
is no physical injury and only mental injury is suffered there are special
rules which limit recovery. For example, entitlement depends upon prov-
ing that a recognised psychiatric illness has been suffered. Only the more
severe forms of mental suffering will suffice.150 Again, therefore, the tort
system is similar to the industrial scheme in strictly limiting these types of
claim. However, it is true to say that they have increased in number in
recent years, and vulnerable employees for whom no special provision is
made are now better able to seek redress from tort if work is a cause of
their mental breakdown.151
3. Other than personal injury
119 Liability can extend to compensation for damage to workers’ property.
However, it is not compulsory to insure against such loss as it is in the case
of personal injury. Property loss, if any, in an employer’s liability case is
usually very small indeed and it rarely figures in settlements.
120 An employer has no liability to reimburse pure economic losses. Thus the
loss of wages resulting from temporary closure of a factory production line
as a result of an accident cannot be claimed in tort by those who do not
suffer physical injury. An employer owes no duty to protect his employee
from economic loss caused by a third party for whom the employer is not
responsible. Specifically, for example, he owes no duty of care to advise his
employee to obtain personal accident insurance against special risks aris-
ing out of his posting overseas.152
121 The common law also does not provide any compensation for dignitary
injuries resulting from discrimination or sexual harassment. However,
scope for such claims can be found in general employment, harassment
149 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co ltd [2008] 1 AC 281.
150 For details see Rogers (fn 24) para 5–61 ff; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (fn 24) 139–156.
151 Hatton v Sutherland [2002] 2 All ER 1.
152 Reid v Rush and Tomkins [1990] Industrial Cases Reports 61.
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and anti-discrimination legislation.153 For example, a claim can be
brought in an employment tribunal if the employer has unfairly dis-
missed the employee, or his actions can be taken as constructively amount-
ing to such a dismissal. The claim must be started within three months.
Compensation is available for financial loss only and not for injury to
feelings. The basic award depends upon the employee’s age and length of
service but this is supplemented by a compensation award which offers
recompense for the financial loss. However, it takes no account of injury to
feelings. At present the upper limit for this compensation award is
£68,400,154 although it is rare for a tribunal to award such a sum unless
the employee is a very high income earner. To avoid these statutory limits
in tribunals, an employee can apply to the courts for wrongful dismissal,
although this is an unusual and more risky course of action.
122Under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 a claim may be brought
in respect of conduct calculated to cause distress and judged to be oppres-
sive and unreasonable.155 The conduct targeted at the claimant must occur
on at least two occasions. It is viewed objectively, and need not amount to
criminality.156 The Act is more generous than either tort or the employ-
ment legislation because it allows the claim to be brought anytime within
six years of the conduct. In addition, compensation is available for mere
anxiety and it is not necessary to show that a positive psychiatric injury
has been suffered. Anxiety and distress alone would not attract compensa-
tion in tort or under the employment legislation. As in tort, proceedings
under the Act are taken via the traditional court system rather than
through an employment tribunal. There are then no financial limits on
the damages that can be obtained so that £800,000 was awarded in one
case.157
123A more general basis for claiming on various grounds of discrimination
now lies under the Equality Act 2010. This offers protection against
discrimination on the basis of sex, age, religion, disability and sexual
orientation. Action against an employer can be taken for failure to take
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination even if it is from a third party,
such as another employee or even a customer. Although damages are
unlimited, in practice compensation awarded for injury to feelings alone
153 S Deakin/G Morris, Labour Law (5th edn 2009); I Smith/G Thomas, Employment Law (9th
edn 2007); N Bamford/M Malik/C O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law (2008).
154 Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2010 (SI No 2926) effective February
2011.
155 Thomas v News Group Newspapers [2001] All ER 246.
156 Veakins v Kier Islington Ltd [2010] Industrial Relations Law Reports (IRLR) 132.
157 Green v Deutsche Bank [2006] IRLR 764.
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do not exceed £30,000,158 and usually are very much lower. Further sums
are payable for loss of earnings or as exemplary damages.
D. Heads and levels of damages
124 Damages in employers’ liability cases are assessed in the same way as for
any other type of personal injury; there are no special rules. Compensation
can be obtained for both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses resulting
from injury or death. The main heads of financial damage are lost earn-
ings and pension losses, with the costs of care and rehabilitation account-
ing for the greater part of the award in the most serious injury cases.
125 Overall non-pecuniary loss accounts for a disproportionate amount of
damages. It was two thirds of the total awarded thirty years ago,159 and it
has remained at about that level. This extraordinary importance given to
pain and suffering reflects the fact that most awards are for relatively
small sums averaging less than £5,000.160 In these cases claimants suffer
very little, if any, financial loss. They make a full recovery from their
bodily injury and are left with no continuing ill effects. In most cases the
accident does not result in any claim for social security benefit. However, a
few claims are much more serious. In 2002 insurers estimated that 1 % of
all cases in the tort system, whether or not involving work injury, resulted
in a payment of £100,000 or more. These few cases were responsible for
32 % of the total damages paid out by the system.161
126 Damages in tort traditionally have been paid only in the form of a lump
sum. This is in stark contrast to disablement benefit under the industrial
scheme which can only be paid as a pension. Although a lump sum is
obviously the most efficient way of disposing of the mass of small claims,
it has attracted much criticism when proving insufficient in cases of long
term injury. There are several reasons for the inadequate provision. For
example, the once and for all payment cannot be reviewed to cater for a
later unforeseen deterioration in the claimant’s condition, although there
158 Da’ Bell v National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children [2010] IRLR 318.
159 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 2 table 107.
160 The median figure was £2,500 in the survey of 81,000 cases receiving legal aid and
closed in 1996–97 in P Pleasence, Personal Injury Litigation in Practice (1998) 40
fig 3.17. P Fenn and N Rickman (Costs of Low Value Liability Claims 1997–2002) report
average damages of only £3,000 for employers liability accident claims, although this
study of almost 100,000 cases related only to claims for less than £15,000. Department
for Constitutional Affairs, <http://www.dca.gov.uk/majrep/claims/elclaims.htm>.
161 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Regulatory Impact Assessment on the Courts Bill (Novem-
ber, 2002) table 1.
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is a very limited ‘provisional damages’ procedure which offers additional
payment if a risk identified in a court order actually materialises. Again,
the traditional lump sum payment cannot be supplemented if the clai-
mant outlives the life expectancy projected when the award was made, or
if inflation or market fluctuations erode the money. Because of these
criticisms, a new way of paying damages has been developed: in some
tort cases which involve future loss it is now possible to obtain periodical
payments instead of the lump sum.
127Periodical payments in the form of ‘structured settlements’ have been
available since 1989 and have been increasingly used in cases of very
serious injury.162 Following legislative intervention, a periodical payment
order must now be considered by a judge in every case involving personal
injury which comes to court if it involves future pecuniary loss.163 Period-
ical payments can then be ordered even if this is opposed by either or both
of the parties.164 There is no longer any need to work out the lump sum
equivalent of the periodical award. Instead the court assesses the period-
ical payments needed by the claimant irrespective of their capital cost.
This is a major change in the way in which damages are assessed and paid.
Another feature is that, as a guard against inflation, it has been agreed that
the pension is to be increased in line with a much more favourable index
than that used in calculating the present day value of a lump sum.165 As a
result of this particular advantage there has been a significant increase in
the number of cases involving periodical payments where serious injury is
involved; it has become the way in which damages must be paid if certain
claimants are to receive their full losses. In particular, to secure the long
term cost of nursing care a periodical award must be sought. Again,
however, for periodical payments no special provision is made for work
injury cases.
E. Administration of claims
128Tort claims for work injury are dealt with by the usual courts administer-
ing civil justice. No specialised tribunals or procedures are involved.
162 R Lewis, Structured Settlements: the Law and Practice (1993); N Bevan/T Huckle/S Ellis,
Future Loss in Practice: Periodical Payments and Lump Sums (2007).
163 Courts Act 2003 s 100.
164 R Lewis, The Politics and Economics of Tort Law: Judicially Imposed Periodical
Payments of Damages (2006) 69 Modern Law Review (MLR) 418.
165 Thompstone v Tameside and Glossop Acute Services NHS Trust [2008] 2 All ER 537; R Lewis,
The Indexation of Periodical Payments of Damages in Tort: The Future Assured?
(2010) 30 Legal Studies 391.
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1. Number and cost of claims
129 In 2010–11 work related injuries comprised about 8 % of all personal
injury claims, being 81,000 out of a total of 987,000.166 This is almost
twice the number of claims that are made for industrial injuries benefit,
and in part reflects the high threshold of injury now required to establish
a benefit claim. However, there are four times as many industrial disable-
ment pensions actually in payment compared to the number of tort claims
for work injury. These 324,000 pensions reflect the accumulation of
entitlement to benefit in previous years. Therefore, although every year
there are more people who receive industrial benefit than a tort award,
this is only because the method of compensation of the benefit involves
continuing payments in contrast to the single lump sum that is usually
awarded in tort.
130 Although work-related tort claims may appear numerous in fact they have
declined in recent years. In 1978 they were the most common type of
action, accounting for 46 % of all personal injury claims.167 Now they
account for only 8 % of all claims. The major reason for this is the
continued rise of motor claims which now constitute four out of five
cases.168 It has always been the case that a smaller proportion of those
injured at work sue in tort compared to those injured bymotor vehicles. In
1978 it was found that whereas one in four injured following a road
accident made a claim, only one in ten did so following a work accident,
and only one in 67 did so if they were injured elsewhere.169 In spite of
stricter liability for work injuries it remains the case that there are many
employees who do not claim.
131 The decline of work claims in the statistics reflects a decline in employ-
ment in traditional industries where often danger was ever-present; few
employees are now involved in making iron and steel or in mining coal.
166 Work injury settlements, rather than new claims made, comprised about 11 % of the
total in that year and numbered 98,000. Department for Work and Pensions, Compensa-
tion Recovery Unit – Performance Statistics <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/other-specia-
lists/compensation-recovery-unit/performance-and-statistics/performance-statistics>.
167 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 2 table 11.
168 Motor claims account for 791,000 of the total of 987,000 claims in 2010–11, having
risen from 102,000 in 1973. Such claims have increased by 40 % in the last three years
alone.
169 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 1 table 5. The table also reveals that overall only 6.5 % of
all accident victims are compensated by the tort system. However, if only serious
injuries are considered tort becomes more important. Where an accident causes
incapacity for work for six months or more, almost a third of claimants receive tort
damages.
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Workplace injuries have fallen substantially in the last five years: in 2010–
11 there were 115,000 injuries reported to the Health and Safety Execu-
tive, 39,000 less than in 2005.170 The decline in tort actions in recent years
also reflects the fact that a spike of claims under the special schemes of
compensation for disease has now worked its way through the system and
no longer affects the statistics. These schemes alone accounted for 760,000
tort claims in the five years from 1999 as discussed above.171
132On average in the five years to 2008 insurers paid out about £1.5 billion a
year in employers’ liability settlements including legal costs. This con-
trasts with the cost of benefits alone under the industrial injuries scheme
of about £800 million a year. There were about 186,000 settlements of
work injury cases a year in tort during that five year period.172 The average
amount per settlement was therefore about £8,000 Given that the clai-
mants’ legal costs constitute over 30 % of the total, claimants received on
average about £5,000 per claim,173 the equivalent of a little over three
months average weekly earnings. Settlements have since declined to
98,000 in 2010–11, and now that the special schemes of compensation
have ended, new claims themselves have fallen to only 81,000. It can
therefore be anticipated that the total cost of the fewer tort claims now
being made will fall to about the same level as the present expenditure
upon the no-fault scheme. One factor which may affect this is that,
although fewer tort claims are being made, the cost of each of them
continues to rise: in the ten years from 1996 the cost of motor claims rose
by over twice the rate of inflation.174
2. Insurers and the administration of the tort system
133Almost all defendants in tort are insured against their liability, including
employers who are required by legislation to be so. This has a considerable
effect upon the administration of the tort system. The practices of insur-
ance companies are essential to the understanding of how the tort system
170 Health and Safety Executive, Statistics 2010/11. <http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/over-
all/hssh1011.pdf>.
171 No 116.
172 Association of British Insurers statistics for 2008 cited by the Department forWork and
Pensions, Accessing Compensation (2010) para 31 <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/
elci-compensation-consultation.pdf>.
173 Ibid para 42 at note 24.
174 International Underwriting Association of London (fn 23). The reasons are examined in
R Lewis/A Morris/K Oliphant, Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: Is there a Compensa-
tion Culture in the UK? (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 158.
England and Wales
187
actually works. In 98 % of tort cases the claim is settled out of court,175 and
the factors affecting the bargains that are struck may be very different to
the strict rules of law that would be applied by a judge. Rough and ready
rules are applied to dispose of claims as efficiently as possible, especially
given the low sum of damages usually being sought.
134 Insurers process these routine payments and they decide which elements
of damage they will accept or contest. It is unusual for them to contest
liability, one study revealing that insurers’ files ‘contained remarkably
little discussion of liability’, finding it initially denied in only 20 % of
cases.176 As a result, eventually insurers make at least some payment in the
great majority of personal injury claims, often because the costs are such
that they are not worth contesting too vigorously. It has been suggested
that about 95 % of work injury cases supported by trade union solicitors
result in some payment to the claimant.177 Tort thus provides a structure
for processing mass payments of small amounts of compensation; only
very rarely does it stage a gladiatorial contest to determine whether a
particular defendant was in the wrong. Contrary to the impression gained
from tort textbooks, duty of care, causation of damage, and even breach of
duty are generally not in dispute in employers’ liability cases processed by
the system.
135 Classic empirical studies reveal that, in practice, the rules of law are much
less important than the tort textbooks might lead one to suppose: it is
insurance bureaucracy that dictates the course of the litigation, and deter-
mines whether, when, and for how much, claims are settled.178 The im-
portant centres of personal injury practice are insurers’ buildings, rather
than courts of law, or even solicitors’ offices. Insurers decide, in particular,
whether a case merits the very exceptional treatment of being taken to a
court hearing. In effect, insurers allow trial judges to determine only one
per cent of all the claims made. Only a few of these are appealed with the
result that the senior judiciary are left to adjudicate upon a small fraction of
what are, by then, very untypical cases. Insurers are of fundamental im-
portance to the administration of tort claims for personal injury.179
175 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 2 table 12. Similarly Pleasence (fn 160) at 12 revealing
that only 5 out of the 762 cases studied went to trial.
176 T Goriely/R Moorhead/P Abrams, More Civil Justice? The Impact of the Woolf Reforms on
Pre-Action Behaviour (2002) 103.
177 Citizens Advice Bureau, No Win, No Fee, No Chance (2004) para 4.31.
178 HGenn, Hard Bargaining (1987),Harris et al (fn 67) and, in the USA,HL Ross, Settled Out
of Court (1980).
179 R Lewis, How Important are Insurers in Compensating Claims for Personal Injury in
the UK? (2006) 31 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 323.
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136In contrast, private insurers now have no part to play in the state-run
industrial injuries scheme. All claims are adjudicated, and there is no
question of a claimant accepting a deal outside the tribunal for a lesser
sum than that to which he is entitled. The discretion of those administer-
ing the system plays little part and, unlike in tort, almost all disputes
focus upon basic entitlement to benefit rather than the amount due.
3. The speed of settlement
137Whereas benefit claims are resolved within three to eight months, tort
claims take much longer. Even though small sums are usually involved,
the majority take between one and two years to process and settle.180 If a
case goes to court the time taken is much longer, averaging between three
and five years.181 The more serious the injury, the longer the time it
takes.182 It has been observed that ‘if it were not for the social security
system, which provides many claimants with benefits during the settle-
ment process, the tort system would probably have collapsed long ago’.183
4. The administrative cost of tort
138The cost of operating the tort system amounts to 85 % of the value of tort
payments distributed to claimants.184 That is, for every pound received by
180 The Department of Social Security reported an average settlement period of 2.3 years
for those tort cases where benefits were recouped from 1990–94, although in 28 % of
cases the recoupment period lasted for between three and five years. See the DSS
Memorandum of Evidence to the Social Security Select Committee (1995) HC 196 appendix B.
Similarly, the median duration of a legally aided tort case where proceedings were
issued was found to be 2.4 years by Pleasence (fn 160) 65 fig 4.21. The Pearson Report
(fn 12) vol 2 table 17 found that 49 % of claims settled within a year and 80 % within
two years of injury.
181 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 2 table 129, and similarly the Lord Chancellor, Report of
the Review Body on Civil Justice (1988, cmd 394).
182 In a study of 153 cases where compensation of £ 150,000 or more was obtained in 1987
and 1988 the average time for settlement was 5 years 4 months. P Cornes, Coping with
Catastrophic Injury (1993) 18.
183 Atiyah’s Accidents (fn 15) 283.
184 The Pearson Report (fn 12) vol 1 para 256. The Lord Chancellor’s Report of the Review
Body on Civil Justice in 1986 estimated that the cost of the tort system consumed 50 to
70 % of the total compensation awarded in personal injury cases. Lord Justice Jackson
found similarly very high costs in his Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report
(January 2010). Data collected for one survey showed that for 280 cases which had come
before the District Court the claimant costs alone amounted to £ 1–80p for every £ 1 of
damages paid. On average, costs exceeded damages for cases settled up to £ 15,000 in
the ‘fast track’ procedure.
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the claimant, the greater part of another pound is consumed in costs. Put
another way, for every pound spent upon the system in total, 55 pence
goes to the claimant and 45 pence in costs. These costs include not only the
legal costs on both sides which insurers have to meet, but also insurers’
costs in administering the system. The claimant’s legal costs alone are
about 30 % of the damages awarded.185
139 The very high cost ratio contrasts with the very much lower figures given
for administering industrial injuries social security payments.186 The
industrial scheme is much more cost effective because it is based on no-
fault, involves few lawyers, and uses the tribunal system rather than the
traditional court structure. However, both systems focus upon minor
injury claims where costs are likely to be out of proportion to the
compensation paid.
F. Rights of recourse
1. Rights of recourse against other employees
140 In theory in a case of vicarious liability an employer can reclaim any
damages paid from the negligent employee who caused the injury.187
However, in practice this does not happen. This is because the legal
decision which confirmed the subrogation right of the employer’s insurer
to stand in the shoes of the employer was very soon overturned by a
private agreement which prevented all insurers from reclaiming the
damages from the negligent employee. When the legal decision allowing
subrogation was made in 1957 it was immediately condemned not only by
trade unionists but also by many employers. It was considered to be
extremely bad for industrial relations. As a result, employers’ representa-
tives met with insurers and privately agreed that an indemnity from the
negligent employee would never be sought unless there had been collu-
sion or wilful misconduct by the employee.188 The Association of British
Insurers continues to maintain a committee to supervise this agreement.
185 International Underwriting Association of London (fn 23) para 7.21.
186 No 85 above.
187 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co [1957] AC 555.
188 The agreement was examined in detail in Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] Queen’s
Bench (QB) 792; R Lewis, Insurers’ Agreements not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights:
Bargaining with Government and in the Shadow of the Law (1985) 48 MLR 275 at 282.
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2. Rights of recourse against third parties
141An employer could seek to reclaim damages from any negligent third
party under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. In effect this could
also be done by the employer joining the third party to the action brought
by the claimant, and seeking to apportion the damages among the joint
tortfeasors. Negligent parties could include, for example, the suppliers of
the defective equipment which caused the injury or the contractor also
responsible for safety on the site. Where injury is caused by a motorist in
the course of employment certain insurers have privately agreed that only
the employer’s liability insurer will pay the damages and the motor
insurer will not be liable.189
G. Interaction with social welfare systems and private insurance
1. Recourse of social security agency against the employer
142Historically, the relationship between damages for personal injury in tort
and social security has been fraught with difficulty. However, a much
clearer picture has emerged following the comprehensive benefit recovery
system set up twenty years ago. This enables the state to reclaim the
precise social security benefits paid for an injury in each case where any
payment of damages in tort for personal injury is later made. Subject to
certain limits, all benefits paid as a result of the tort can be recovered from
whoever pays the damages. This scheme was outlined in an earlier book in
this series,190 and it has been considered by the author in detail else-
where.191
143In the great majority of work injury cases the compensator required to
repay the benefits is the employer’s liability insurer. As exceptions to this,
a few large employers and government organisations are allowed to self-
insure and pay damages directly themselves. However, if no tort claim is
brought, benefits cannot be recovered even though it may appear that an
employer was responsible for the injury. The state has no independent
right of recourse against a tortfeasor; its reimbursement is parasitic upon
the claim in tort brought by the injured employee. There are no bulk
189 E Whitmore, Employers’ Liability Insurance (1962) 158 and appendix vii.
190 Magnus (fn 18) 56–85.
191 R Lewis, Deducting Benefits from Damages for Personal Injury (1999).
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recovery agreements as there are in other EU countries which enable levies
to be raised from insurers in a broad brush fashion.
144 The state had no such right of recourse until 1990. Legislation then
established the Compensation Recovery Unit as a state agency to claw
back the welfare benefits paid to accident victims up to the date of the
settlement of their damages claim.192 In practice, this agency rarely needs
to mount a separate recourse action to recover the benefit paid. This is
because, in each case where damages for personal injury are to be paid, the
compensator is first required to investigate the benefits which have been
paid to the claimant as a result of the injury. A computerised system
produces very accurate certificates of the amount of benefit in question.
Then, on paying the damages, the compensator has a duty to repay the
amount in the certificate to the Recovery Unit. This reimbursement has
become routine, and is part of the administrative process involved in
disposing of every successful tort claim. Industrial injury disablement
benefit is specified as one of the benefits to be recovered and represents
about 15 % of the total amount recovered by the state.193 In 2009–2010
that total was £139 million of which £75 million related to work inju-
ries.194 Although work accidents account for less than 10 % of claims in
tort they are therefore responsible for over half of the benefits recovered.
145 The period during which benefit can be recovered begins, in the case of an
accident, on the day after it happened. In the case of a disease it begins on
the day on which the first claim for benefit in respect of the disease was
made. The period of recovery ends either five years after the recovery
period began, or on the date when final compensation is paid, whichever
is sooner. In practice this means that in the vast majority of cases the
recovery period ends on the date of settlement of the case because most
claims are concluded well within the five year cut-off period. The state
cannot recover benefits which may be paid to the claimant in the future,
that is, after the settlement agreement or court order. This limit means
that the industrial accident victim who continues to receive disablement
benefit for the rest of his life will receive compensation which may overlap
with any provision also made by the tort system for his future loss.
192 Social Security Act 1989. Major revisions were made eight years later, the current
legislation being the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997.
193 Based on a private reply to the author from the Department for Work and Pensions in
2006 and relating to 2004–05. Over £ 24 million in disablement benefit was recovered
that year.
194 Department for Work and Pensions (fn 166) <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/other-specialists/
compensation-recovery-unit/performance-and-statistics/performance-statistics>.
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2. Reducing damages to take account of the benefits paid
146Although the compensator has a duty to repay the benefits received in full,
in most cases the cost of doing so is reduced because the compensator is
allowed to set off the benefits against part of the damages due to the
injured person. The amount of damages paid is therefore reduced. As a
result, in theory, the claimant then obtains no more than he has lost, the
defendant pays in full, and the public purse avoids bearing the cost of
financially supporting those injured by another’s wrongdoing. The
scheme is attractive because it appears to avoid not only subsidising the
defendant but also over-compensating the accident victim, at least during
the period before his damages claim is settled.
147Although the compensator can set off the benefit he must repay to the
state against certain parts of the damages for which he is liable, he is
limited in the extent that he can reduce the damages that must be paid to
the claimant. In particular damages for non-pecuniary loss are ‘ring-
fenced’ so that no industrial injuries or any other benefit can be deducted
from them. Although industrial injuries benefit itself in effect is a form of
non-pecuniary loss, the recovery scheme allows only for it to be deducted
from damages paid for income loss.
148The compensator’s ability to reduce damages places considerable pressure
upon claimants to settle their cases as soon as possible. The incentive for
claimants is ‘settle today and keep tomorrow’s benefits; settle tomorrow
and you will lose them’. In some circumstances the time factor can also be
used as a bargaining tactic to persuade the compensator to accept the
terms offered. The social security system thus has an effect not only upon
the value of a tort claim but also upon the way in which it is administered
and the speed with which it is settled.
3. Recovering the cost of National Health Service treatment
149The benefit recovery scheme has been extended to enable the cost of
hospital treatment provided under the National Health Service to be
recovered.195 The scheme is parasitic upon the benefit recovery scheme,
and requires the repayment of costs to be made at the same time that tort
damages are paid to the claimant. Of course, this includes the cost of NHS
195 Originally under the Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Act 1999 and now the Health and
Social Care Act 2003. R Lewis, Recovery of NHS Accident Costs: Tort as a Vehicle for
Raising Public Funds (1999) 62 MLR 903.
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treatment for the victim of industrial injury. The payment due is based on
a fixed charge related to the number of days of hospital treatment and the
use of ambulances. The maximum recoverable in any one case is about
£44,000. Compensators were required to pay a total of £195 million in
2010–2011196 this being 40 % more than the amount of social security
benefit recovered that year.197 Health benefit recovery is therefore now
more important than that for social security.
H. Insurance
1. The scope of compulsory insurance
150 It was not until 1972 that it became compulsory for an employer to insure
against liability to employees injured in the course of their employ-
ment.198 Separate policies are issued instead of cover being combined
within, for example, policies issued for public liability in general or for
liability for motor vehicles. All employers are required to insure except for
nationalised industries, health service bodies, local authorities and certain
public bodies who are otherwise able to guarantee their liabilities. How-
ever, small family businesses are also exempt from obtaining employers’
liability insurance provided that the employees are all close family mem-
bers. This has been the subject of criticism because this exemption is not
granted in motor insurance when close family members are being carried
in the vehicle. It is not obvious why a farmer should be compelled to
insure his sons when being carried in his car, but not when driving a
tractor in the fields or helping him with what may be other dangerous
tasks involved in his work.199 Employers must be insured only up to £5
million, a sum which has not kept pace with inflation and is thought
insufficient in the event of multiple claims in respect of a major accident.
By contrast motorists must carry unlimited liability for causing death or
196 Department of Health, NHS Injury Costs Recovery Scheme – Amounts Collected <http://
www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/
dh_125921.pdf>.
197 Department for Work and Pensions (fn 166) <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/other-specialists/
compensation-recovery-unit/performance-and-statistics/performance-statistics/>.
198 Employers Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 and the relevant regulations (SI
1998 No 2573); C Parsons, Employers Liability Insurance – How Secure is the System?
(1999) 28 Industrial Law Journal (ILJ) 109.
199 RA Hasson, The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act – A Broken Reed
(1974) ILJ 79.
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personal injury. The cost of employers’ insurance in total is only about
0.25 % of the national payroll.200
151Failure to comply with the statutory obligation to insure is subject to
sanctions in the criminal law. Employers can be fined up to £2,500 a day,
but in practice the fines are low and enforcement is limited. The extent to
which there is compliance with the duty to insure varies. One review
suggested that only about 1 in 200 employers do not have the requisite
cover,201 although an earlier survey found a much higher figure for non-
compliance.202 If an employer fails to insure, there are no reserve funds
available to meet the claim as there would be if injury were caused by an
uninsured motorist. If the employer has insufficient funds of his own, the
injured employee’s claim may then be worthless. Overall the insurance
system does not protect workers nearly as well as it does motorists.
2. Policy limits and insurance triggers
152Although employers must be insured up to a minimum of £5 million for
each occurrence, in practice, insurers issue policies with limits of twice
that sum. However, whether the loss in question is covered depends upon
whether there are further restrictions in the policy because of clauses
dealing either with the aggregate limit to liability or with how a series of
claims are to be dealt with.203 Another problem is with ‘long-tail’ damage
where liability issues arise many years after the policy was issued and the
claimant was first exposed to the risk. What triggers liability under the
policy and from what date? The answer is usually easy to provide in cases
involving accidents because the exact point in time when the sudden event
occurs which causes injury is generally easy to identify. However, where
the loss occurs gradually, especially if the damage remains undiscoverable
for many years, it can be much more difficult to decide whether there is
insurance coverage and, if so, which insurer is liable. There have been
200 Department for Work and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Compulsory Insurance:
First Stage Report (2003) <http://www.detini.gov.uk/dw2583_employers_review.pdf>
at 20.
201 Department for Work and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Compulsory Insurance:
Second Stage Report (2004).
202 The Small Business Service telephone survey of over 2,000 businesses in 2002 sug-
gested that the figure was 1 in 14.
203 Explained more fully in R Lewis, Aggregation and Divisibility of Damage in England
and Wales: Insurance, in: K Oliphant (ed), Aggregation and Divisibility of Damage
(2009) 125.
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particular problems with claims for cancer or asbestos-related disease.204
Broadly there are three possible triggers for the insurance policy: first,
when the claimant was initially exposed; second, when physical change
first occurs, even if it cannot be discovered; and finally, when the injury
becomes manifest. In the USA any of these three triggers has been
considered sufficient to gain access to the insurance fund. This helps to
ensure that there are no insurance gaps and claimants are more likely to
receive compensation. However, in the UK this approach has been rejected
as unnecessarily wide.205 The most recent case makes the insurer liable
when injury was sustained rather than when the claimant was exposed,206
but much depends on the particular facts and the precise wording of the
policy. As a result, in individual cases the extent of insurer liability
remains certain.
3. Apportionment
153 No matter what the trigger, there could be several insurers involved
during the relevant period of exposure or development of the disease.
There is then the problem of apportioning liability among them. There
are various possibilities. For example, the insurers could each be held
jointly and severally liable up to their policy limits. Alternatively, they
could be held responsible only for a share of the damage based on the
different lengths of time they were exposed to risk, or in proportion to the
different financial limits in the respective policies.
154 In the key case it was held that the insurers were not liable in full for the
damage caused but only to the extent of the probability that the employer
they insured had caused the asbestos-related injury.207 This could have led
to substantial under-compensation of those who had worked for several
employers and who, for a variety of reasons, could not sue or enforce a
judgment against one or more of them. As a result, the decision led to
considerable protest from claimants, their trade unions and their lawyers.
The Government immediately took action. For asbestos cases alone involv-
ing the disease mesothelioma, the court decision was effectively reversed
204 For discussion in relation to asbestos see C Lahnstein, D Maranger and N Roenneberg’s
article in: Munich Re Group (ed), 7th International Liability Forum (2003).
205 Bolton v MBC Mutual Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 1492.
206 Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd [2010] All ER (D) 88. Appeal to the Supreme Court is awaited.
207 Barker v Corus [2006] AC 572. This applies only where there are alternative and not
concurrent causes which cause injury which is indivisible.
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by legislation208 which makes defendants liable jointly and severally for
the whole of the damage. Asbestos claimants thus gain full compensation
even if only one of the former employers has insurance coverage. However,
apart from these asbestos cases, the proportionate damages approach
adopted in the key case remains good law.
IV. Evaluation and Conclusions
A. Compensation
1. Scope of each scheme
155Both the industrial injuries scheme and employers’ liability in tort operate
alongside one another in the UK to provide injured workers with about £2
billion a year. About 120,000 new claims are now made each year under
one or other of these schemes, with there being twice as manymade in tort
compared to the industrial scheme. These figures represent about one
claim made for every 240 people in employment, although that figure
does not allow for the fact that many of those injured are able to claim
both tort damages and industrial benefit.
156There are various exclusions from the schemes. For example, both com-
pensate only if workers are injured ‘in the course of employment’ and
their wrongdoing may affect entitlement. Both schemes have had only a
limited role to play in compensating victims of disease and ill-health even
though these are increasingly being related to work.209 In addition, it
remains the case that for a variety of reasons many of those injured do not
make a claim at all under either scheme. Nevertheless, at least in theory,
the two schemes do cover many of the injuries suffered at work even if, in
practice, the compensation they provide is less important than the social
security system overall in meeting the needs of those who are disabled.
2. Amount and purpose of compensation
157A key distinction between the two schemes concerns the level of compen-
sation. It is possible for a tort claimant to receive damages of millions of
pounds whereas the recipient of industrial disablement benefit can get
208 Compensation Act 2006 s 3.
209 Nos 58 and 116 above.
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only a small fixed pension. Even if we take account of the capitalised value
of this inflation proofed pension, it will not compare with the highest
awards in tort. However, in practice both schemes are flooded with small
claims so that the average award in tort may not be so different from the
long-term value of disablement benefit.210
158 The basis for assessing compensation under the two schemes appears very
different. Whereas an objective approach divorced from the claimant’s
particular circumstances is taken under the industrial injuries scheme, the
tort system supposedly tailors its award to the precise losses suffered by
the individual. Disablement benefit is fixed by using simple tables related
to the degree of disability so that all in the same bracket get the same
award irrespective of their real losses. The compensation must be in
proportion to the maximum set. By contrast in tort, although there are
conventional maxima, there are no such fixed legislative limits. Instead
the aim is to return the claimant to the financial future enjoyed before the
injury. This ambitious objective makes little difference in minor injury
cases but, where there is serious injury, it results in complex computa-
tions. Although the approach adds to the expense of dealing with claims,
it offers claimants full compensation for their injury, something which
often cannot be obtained under the industrial scheme.
159 Full compensation in tort means that damages compensate for both pecuni-
ary and non-pecuniary losses. In contrast, the industrial scheme pays
nothing at all for financial losses so that there is no reimbursement for lost
earnings or the costs of care. The industrial scheme is therefore very limited
in the indemnity it offers. It also privileges what has been classified as a
secondary, less important, form of compensation over the primary need for
replacement of direct financial loss.211 In practice, however, this distinction
between tort and the industrial scheme is not quite so clear cut because both
systems deal mostly with small claims which cause little if any financial
loss. This results in the damages actually awarded in tort being predomi-
nantly composed of non-pecuniary loss thus exposing it to the same criti-
cism that can then be levelled at the industrial injuries scheme: both focus
upon losses of secondary importance.
160 A final distinction between the two schemes concerns how the compensa-
tion is paid. Many problems are caused by awarding damages in tort as a
lump sum on a once-and-for-all basis.212 To an extent these may be
210 Nos 76 and 125 above.
211 Atiyah’s Accidents (fn 15) ch 6.
212 No 126 above.
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avoided by periodical payments. Disablement benefit can only be paid in
this form. The pension can be regularly increased to match inflation and
will not run out only because the claimant lives longer than expected.
However, in recent years in some serious injury cases tort damages have
also been awarded in the form of a pension and the distinction now has a
little less force.
3. Fault and no-fault
161At first sight it may appear that tort is very different from the industrial
scheme because it requires proof of fault whereas wrongdoing seems to
have little part to play in a claim for benefit. In particular, the defence of
contributory negligence reduces damages in about a quarter of all tort
claims whereas no such reduction can take place under the industrial
scheme. The fault principle has both its critics and supporters. Critics, for
example, argue that it is an uncertain standard, difficult and expensive to
apply. It often does not correspond to popular notions of moral responsi-
bility for causing injury.213 Supporters of the benefit system therefore
celebrate the absence of fault from the state scheme.
162However, again this difference between the two schemes is not as great as it
may seem: fault may not be the great divide. This is because, firstly, under
the industrial scheme fault can be relevant in determining not only the
course of employment but also causation issues. Secondly, in tort fault is
often not required for employers to be liable because strict liability is
imposed. We also know that, in practice, because of the uncertainty and
the cost involved, fault is contested by insurers in only a minority of claims
and only very rarely in cases of low value. In reality, both schemes are
predominantly no-fault regimes for less serious injuries. As a result the
difference between the schemes may not be as significant as it first appears.
B. Prevention
163Neither the tort nor the industrial injuries system has much effect upon
reducing the number of injuries at work.214 Both are poor in deterring
unsafe practices. The industrial scheme is especially weak because it is
now paid for by the state from general taxation and no separate funding
213 Atiyah’s Accidents (fn 15) ch 7.
214 Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Committee 1970–72 (1972, Cmnd 5034)
(Chairman Lord Robens).
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system exists. Even in the past, when contributions were raised from
employers, no account was taken of the relative risk posed by different
industries because differential rating was thought ineffective in reducing
claims.215 In contrast, the tort system does not involve state funds. It is
paid for by employers alone with the cost in practice falling upon private
insurers. On the surface there appears to be a risk relationship because
insurers require differential premiums from employers. However, this has
been thought a very ineffective means of influencing risky behaviour.
Only half of all employers engage a sufficiently large number of workers
in order to be rated according to their own accident experience. Instead
most employers are classified alongside others of a similar kind and the
premiums that they pay are then unaffected by accidents that occur at
their particular workplace. More direct action by insurers in giving advice
concerning risks can have some effect, but the scope for this is limited.216
More important incentives to avoid injury are the costs associated with the
general disruption to the work process when an accident occurs rather
than the price that has to be paid as a result of any action in tort. Both tort
and the industrial scheme have been of some help in identifying the cause
of injury but overall they have had little effect upon reducing the inci-
dence of injury.
C. Overall costs
164 There are considerable differences between the schemes with regard to
their administration and efficiency in delivering compensation. The tort
system is much less accessible and much more expensive to run than the
state scheme. It is administered largely by private insurers using the
traditional civil justice court system. Lawyers are closely involved,
although most cases are settled well before formal legal proceedings are
begun with only 1 % of cases being determined by a judge in court. In
contrast, the industrial injuries scheme is run by the state via a more
informal tribunal system. All cases are determined by an adjudicating
authority and never settled as a result of a bargain. Lawyers are much less
likely to play a part. As a result there is a major difference in the cost of
delivering compensation: whereas the tort system costs 85 % of the com-
pensation it pays out, the industrial scheme costs only 2 %.217 Claimant
215 No 80 above.
216 Dewees/Duff/Trebilcock (fn 23); Armstrong/Tess (fn 109) and Atiyah’s Accidents (fn 15)
ch 17. For a more equivocal view see Rogers (fn 24) paras 1–29 ff.
217 Nos 85 and 138–139 above.
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legal costs alone in tort are over 30 % of damages paid and these must be
borne by insurers. The difference in the systems also means that it takes
more time for tort damages to be paid even in minor injury cases. When
serious injury is involved this difference can be measured in years rather
than months. Justice delayed then can often mean justice denied.
165Of course, these criticisms of tort can be countered by pointing to the
reasons for the delays and costs involved: the subjective assessment of
damages in tort may be complex but it can offer muchmore compensation
for seriously injured claimants than the simple mechanical objective
formula used to arrive at the industrial pension; tort lump sums necessi-
tate delay in order to assess the full effects of claimants’ injuries; and
lawyers supposedly offer greater sophistication, accuracy and justice when
determining entitlement. Nevertheless, the difference in administration
and efficiency between the two systems here is very considerable.
D. Interaction between workers’ compensation and private law
166Both systems add to the complexity of the compensation structure overall
and necessitate special rules to deal with overlapping compensation from
collateral benefits. The criticism is that a wasteful system involving
duplicate payments presently exists. In the past twenty years a new state
agency has been established to recover the social security and health costs
of injuries which result in an award of damages in tort. This requires a
detailed analysis of each claim paid and it results in additional cost.
However, the state recovers over £335 million a year from the scheme
and now has an interest in each tort claim brought. From the claimant’s
viewpoint, where benefits are initially received they can be seen as merely
short-term loans from the state to tide them over until they obtain their
tort damages. However, the recovery scheme does help to minimise
duplication of payment from the different sources and the possibility of
over-compensation.218
E. Plans for reform
167There are no major plans to reform the substantive law relating to either
the industrial injuries system or tort liability for work accidents. However,
there are considerable changes proposed to the way in which tort claims
218 No 146 above.
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generally are funded and costs allocated.219 These changes are expected to
have a major impact upon the number and type of cases litigated.220 By
contrast a wide-ranging Government consultation paper on the industrial
injuries scheme in 2007 resulted in only very minor reforms.221
F. Overall quality of each system independently and in
combination
Why preferential compensation for workers?
168 The quality and effectiveness of each system has been examined in detail
above. But a final question must be asked. Both tort and the industrial
injuries scheme offer easier routes to compensation to those injured at
work as opposed to elsewhere. Workers can even claim under both
schemes. Is this preference justified?222 This fundamental question lies at
the heart not only of the future of welfare state provision but also
compensation for personal injury in tort. How efficient and fair are our
systems of compensation? For those who favour equal compensation for
the same loss or injury nomatter what the cause – and at an administrative
cost which is not out of proportion to the monies distributed – much
remains to be done.
169 This article is very unusual in comparing the system of compensation
established by tort with an area of provision made by the welfare state. In
providing details of how each system actually operates in practice and in
supplying the relevant statistical data, this article employs techniques
which it is hoped may appeal to others involved in the work of the
European Centre of Tort and Insurance.
219 Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (December 2009)
considered in K Oliphant et al, On a Slippery Slope (2011) <http://ectil.org/oliphant/
slippery-slope/>.
220 R Lewis, Litigation Costs and Before-The-Event Insurance: The Key to Access to Justice?
(2011) 74 MLR 272.
221 Department for Work and Pensions, The Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit Scheme –
a Consultation Paper (2007) and Department for Work and Pensions, Consultation Report
(2007).
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